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INTRODUCTION
A source of continuing controversy and mystery in corporate tax
law is the acceptability of certain recharacterizations' of taxpayer
transactions and the unsuitability of others in the eyes of both the
courts and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service").2 Al-
though it is generally understood that taxpayers may be held to the
form in which they cast a transaction if this form is agreeable to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' little is known about those types of
forms that taxpayers may employ successfully to escape various taxes or
the extent of the Commissioner's power to recharacterize various tax-
payer maneuvers.4 No systematic framework for analyzing recharacter-
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I have benefited greatly from conver-
sations with Boris Bittker, Richard Fallon, Henry Hansmann, Hideki Kanda, Julie
Roin, Roberta Romano, and Paul Stephan, and from a workshop at the Boston Univer-
sity School of Law.
I A recharacterization is simply the renaming or recasting of a taxpayer's transac-
tion by the Internal Revenue Service or the courts to match its perceived substance or
true character. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF COR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 14.51 (5th ed. 1987) (discussing how the judicial
doctrines of "business purpose," "continuity of business enterprise," and "step-transac-
tions" are used to recharacterize or recast corporate reorganizations); see, e.g., Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (discussing a failed attempt to recharacterize
a tax-free reorganization as a taxable sale of a business).
2 See, e.g., Clark v. Commissioner, 828 F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir. 1987) (puzzling
over whether to characterize a distribution as occurring before or after a corporate
reorganization).
I See B. BITTKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 1, 1 14.51 (noting that, in practice,
,the step-transaction principle is most often applied at the request of the government
rather than over its opposition); Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law
of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 472-74 (1968) (analyzing Hand's decisions con-
cerning the acceptance of a taxpayer's choice of form for assessing tax obligations).
4 See generally Chirelstein, supra note 3; Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxa-
tion: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J. 861, 912-13 (1976) (proposing that the
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izations has emerged that explains this phenomenon in corporate tax
law.
This Article focuses on transactions governed by subchapter C of
the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), surely the heartland of
recharacterization questions. It argues that four rules have justifiably
influenced the acceptability of recharacterizations. These rules are that
recharacterizations be "complete," "consistent," "brief," and "direct."
Part I of this Article introduces the four rules that comprise this theory.
Part II utilizes the rules in the context of specific recharacterization
questions that arise in corporate tax law. Finally, Part III explores the
normative aspects of this analytical framework. While much of the law
governing these transactions has substantial normative ambiguity, this
Article will argue that these four descriptive rules have an implicit nor-
mative component that supports their appeal as a guide to recharacter-
ization questions.
I. THE HIDDEN RULES OF CORPORATE TAX LAW
The four recharacterization rules set forth in this Article have dis-
tinct meanings. A "complete" recharacterization is one with compo-
nents that explain all available data without contradicting reality. For
example, assume that A and B are each 50% shareholders of a corpora-
tion that pays money to A alone. Completeness might be satisfied by a
claim that this payment to A was a salary, especially if A planned to
work for the corporation. Completeness would not be satisfied, how-
ever, by a claim that there was a redemption of A's shares alone. So
long as A and B continue to enjoy equal voting power, there will be
evidence contradicting the claim that only A's shares were redeemed.
Similarly, a claim that the corporation distributed a pro rata dividend
to both A and B, thereby increasing the assets or wealth of each share-
holder, would also be incomplete. Financial data concerning the relative
assets of the parties will contradict this dividend recharacterization be-
cause, in reality, only A's assets increased during the actual transaction.
Such unexplained facts, or loose ends, do not exist in complete
recharacterizations.
A "consistent" recharacterization does not contradict another
consistent treatment of tax concepts in deciding different tax issues will result in greater
statutory simplicity and predictability). For background to the approach taken in this
Article, see generally Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statu-
tory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977) (tracing the development and
synthesis of corporate tax law and its utility for tax reform efforts by examining alter-
natives not taken in the law). Discussion of the substantive topics discussed herein can
also be found in B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1.
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recharacterization or ordering5 that is deemed acceptable by the tax
system. For example, if A is taxed as having received compensation
from the corporation, then it would be inconsistent to deny the corpora-
tion a deduction for that payment if it is reasonable.' This simple illus-
tration of consistency avoids the question of when circumstances are
sufficiently related to require consistent treatment, much as the apho-
rism "like cases should be treated alike" only begins the process of
identifying relevant similarities and distinctions. The boundaries of
consistency are confronted in more detail in Part III of this Article; for
now, it is sufficient to note that consistency may require that
recharacterizations of two "related" transactions manifest a symmetry
or coherence in the application of the tax law.7
A "direct" recharacterization is one that does not overshoot and
then return to its mark. An itinerary that takes a traveler from New
York to Chicago by way of Seattle is quintessentially indirect. Simi-
larly, it would be indirect to describe A, who was oversalaried in the
earlier example, as first having received an amount larger than she now
really enjoys and then returning the difference to the corporation as a
gift. Such a sequence would avoid incompleteness, for it would place
the same assets at the parties' disposal as they ultimately enjoyed in
reality. Completeness is achieved, however, only by overshooting and
then backtracking to the real amount enjoyed by A.
Finally, a "brief" recharacterization takes no more steps to achieve
completeness than does another available recharacterization. 8 Similar to
the other rules, this last rule of recharacterization is derived from the
methods of scientific inquiry which often favor elegance in the form of
fewer explanatory variables." For example, the indirect recharacteriza-
1 Competing recharacterizations often differ only in the order in which they place
components of a transaction. See, e.g., infra notes 74-77, 96-97 and accompanying text.
I See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982) (allowing deductions for salary expenses, but not
dividends paid). Consistency of the sort just sketched is likely to be a murky and, per-
haps, impossible norm. At a minimum, its very mention leads to questions of how to
define the boundaries of the system in which there will be consistency and how to
decide when things are close enough in subject so as to expect consistent treatments.
These matters are confronted lightly in Part III.
In order to conform to A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, § 12.8.1 (14th ed.
1986), the citations to the Internal Revenue Code provided in this Article refer to 26
U.S.C. (1982), 26 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985) and/or 26 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1987),
depending on the date relevant amendments were codified in the United States Code,
rather than to the 1986 Internal Revenue Code. All section references in this Article,
however, are identical to those appropriate under the 1986 Code.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 112-16, 129-34.
' These definitions allow an indirect characterization to be as brief as a direct one
because it may not be possible to take the shortest route between two points without
being incomplete.
' This notion of economy has ancient origins. See G. LEFF, WILLIAM OF OCKHAM
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tion sketched earlier appears inelegant compared to the simple, briefer
tale of a salary payment to A.
Although the definition of these four recharacterization rules may
appear to have substantial normative content, Part II of this Article
begins with a strongly positive bias. The discussion explores the de-
scriptive utility of the rules just defined in distinguishing between those
recharacterizations and arguments that seem to succeed in corporate tax
law and those that do not. The four distinctions, tools, or "hidden
rules" are developed through a discussion of various transactions that
haunt the student and practitioner of subchapter C.1"
II. RECHARACTERIZATIONS AND THE HIDDEN RULES OF
CORPORATE TAX LAW
A. Recharacterizing Excessive Salaries
The notion of completeness in the recharacterization of events in
the law is hardly novel. Much as an accusation of murder is more com-
pelling if the prosecutor is able to explain how a weapon bearing the
defendant's fingerprints caused a death, so too the Commissioner's
claim for tax revenues or taxpayers' arguments against the imposition
of certain taxes may be more compelling when they attach to stories
that fully explain observable events. The search for perfect complete-
ness in tax matters is often futile, however, because by extracting
money, the tax process itself interferes with the chain of observable
events. Nevertheless, a consideration of the completeness of recharacter-
izations with respect to pretax financial data is useful.
This suggestion can be examined in more detail in the following
hypothetical which expands upon the example introduced earlier."1 As-
sume that A and B are the two 50% shareholders of Corporation X.
Apart from their involvement with X, they are unrelated shareholders.
A is the managing officer of X while B is a passive investor. X's profits
amount to $1,400,000 before tax and before the payment of a salary to
A. X pays A a salary of $400,000, reports a net profit of $1,000,000,
and pays a corporate tax of $340,000 under section 11 of the Internal
35 & n.141 (1975) (attributing to Aristotle the principle, "it is vain to do by more what
can equally be done by fewer").
'0 This ,Article does not explore the utility of these rules with respect to all areas
of corporate tax law in which recharacterizations figure prominently. For example,
there is no discussion of the "spinning-off" of unwanted assets by a corporation. The
rules developed here, however, will be useful in many areas of tax law.
11 For a sampling of cases which correspond to this first hypothetical, see S. SUR-
REY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, 2 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 305-
310 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter S. SURREY].
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Revenue Code.1" The remaining $660,000 is then paid out in dividends
to A and B. Assume that the Internal Revenue Service later correctly
determines that one half of the $400,000 salary to A was excessive and
improperly deducted by X. Assume further that X has a sufficiently
large earnings and profits account for dividend distributions to receive
ordinary income treatment.13 Before the excess salary determination,
the Service collected tax on the $400,000 salary and on the $330,000
dividend distribution from A, and it collected tax on the $330,000 divi-
dend from B. Given the individual tax rate of 28% applicable to A and
B,1' the Commissioner has collected $204,400 from A (28% of the sum
of $400,000 and $330,000) and $92,400 from B (28% of $330,000).
Including the $340,000 collected from X, the government has thus col-
lected a total of $636,800. The following question now arises: what sort
of tax treatment should apply to the excessive salary? Assuming that no
fraud claim is contemplated by the Internal Revenue Service, six possi-
ble recharacterizations, or tax treatments, are particularly noteworthy.
(a) Characterize the excess salary as a gift from X to A, and
accept both the dividends as paid to A and B and the remain-
der of A's salary as they were originally cast.
This recharacterization will produce a number of tax conse-
quences. First, and trivially, it will allow X to deduct $25 of this gift
under section 274(b).15 More importantly, B, as an implicitly agreeable
shareholder, is treated for gift tax purposes as having transferred half
of the excess salary or gift of $100,000 to A. X is then denied the
$200,000 excess deduction. 6 Finally, A is entitled to a refund because
she paid a tax on $730,000 but is now regarded as receiving $530,000
of taxable income.
This recharacterization is complete. A and B are equal sharehold-
ers at the close of the recharacterization and B's bank account has in-
12 See I.R.C. § 11 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987) (imposing a 34%
corporate tax rate).
See I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a) (1982).
j, See I.R.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
See I.R.C. § 274(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987) (limiting
deduction for gift claimed as business expense under I.R.C. § 162 to $25). It is con-
ceivable that the Commissioner would seek to disallow even such a limited deduction as
neither ordinary nor necessary. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982) (allowing deductions for
ordinary and necessary business expenses).
16 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (1987) (stating that a gift from a corpora-
tion to one of its shareholders "is a gift to [the shareholder] from the other stockholders,
but only to the extent it exceeds [the implicit donor's] own interest in such amount as a
shareholder"). The rule seems incomplete in failing to describe the character of the
portion received that is not a gift, but because (a) is of little interest to the Commis-
sioner, it is unnecessary to pursue further the gift tax rules.
19881
1024 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
creased by $330,000 as a result of the dividend paid by X. A's $730,000
is similarly accounted for, from a combination of salary, gift, and divi-
dend sources, and X has paid out $1,060,000 apart from its tax liabili-
ties. None of these events is contradicted or left unexplained by a real-
world occurrence. Recharacterization (a) will require X to pay more to
the government than X actually paid before the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue intervened. Similarly, the refund that is owed A might at
first seem to indicate that (a) contradicts reality. It would be unrealis-
tic, however, to weigh such contradictions heavily and to expect "per-
fect" completeness even with respect to after-tax events. For example,
the government can surely claim payments from a taxpayer who has
spent all her income and paid no taxes, a move which presupposes a
right to undo the reality that the taxpayer has created. In short, there is
little utility in assessing the after-tax completeness of a recharacteriza-
tion and (a), therefore, can be labeled "complete" because, excluding
tax liabilities, nothing in (a) contradicts the events that occurred in re-
ality. This Article does not suggest that (a) ought to be the method of
the law simply because it is complete. First, there are likely to be many
competing complete recharacterizations of any transaction. More im-
portantly, it would be a mistake to leap from an aesthetic reaction trig-
gered by one illustration to a normative conclusion. It is more useful for
the moment to focus on the positive power of rules like completeness to
distinguish between recharacterizations that are acceptable and unac-
ceptable to the courts or the Internal Revenue Service.'"
When the corporate tax rate is higher than the individual rate, the
tax consequences associated with (a) are somewhat attractive to the
Commissioner. The government will collect an additional $68,000 from
X (34% of $200,000) and a few thousand dollars by way of a gift tax
on B. On the other hand, A is entitled to a $56,000 refund (28% of
$200,000) because A mistakenly reported her gift as taxable income. If
A's marginal tax rate is higher than X's, 8 then (a) is unattractive to the
1" The discussion in Part III argues that there is normative content to positive
rules like completeness, but the immediate task is to assess the positive strength of
various suggested rules. The tools developed in this Article may not be particularly
useful in describing the explicit rules found in the Code itself. Congress can, for exam-
ple, simply decree that something like pension benefits given by an employer to an
employee is deductible to the former and yet not income to the latter. Completeness
would not, therefore, be a useful concept in predicting legislative behavior. See infra
note 70. Although this Article addresses only tangentially the question of why judges or
other decisionmakers might behave as if they aimed for completeness, consistency, brev-
ity, and directness, it seems evident that any plausible theory of legislation must be
quite different from any convincing theory of judicial decisionmaking.
"I In the current two-tier tax system, corporate rates are higher than individual
(shareholder) rates. Compare I.R.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987)
(28% rate on individuals) with I.R.C. § 11 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp.
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Commissioner who may owe more to A than is now collected from X
and B. Because the Commissioner is not required to accept the first
complete characterization that can be attached to a transaction crafted
by taxpayers, it is useful to consider other revenue-raising alternatives.
(b) Disallow $200,000 of X's deductions and collect an addi-
tional $68,000 in corporate tax. The $660,000 in dividends
paid out by X is accepted as cast, in addition to the first
$200,000 paid to A as salary. The character of the second
$200,000 received by A is ignored.
Alternative (b) is the easiest revenue-raising path available to the
Commissioner. It adds $26,000 to the total tax bill, although it fails to
explain the source of all of A's money. This incompleteness cannot be
sidestepped by a claim that A has simply been mistakenly overpaid be-
cause the law will not permit taxpayers to reverse these steps. If A
returned the excess, the Commissioner would not forgive A's tax on all
that she originally received.19 Moreover, the law of restitution will not
normally allow X to force A to return the overpayment. 20
The characterization in (b), moreover, yields consequences which
are incongruous with those encountered by similarly situated taxpayers
who correctly report their dealings. Had X originally paid a reasonable
salary of $200,000, then paid $408,000 (34% of $1,200,000) in corpo-
rate tax, and then distributed the remaining $792,000 as a dividend to
A and B, the government's total catch would have been $685,760
($408,000 plus 28% of the sum of $200,000 and $792,000). The Com-
missioner in (b), however, asks not simply for this amount, as opposed
to the $636,800 actually paid, but rather for $704,800. In the absence
of a statutory penalty, an attempt to collect more than the Code actu-
1987) (34% rate on corporations). This rate structure must be short-lived, however, for
it discourages conducting business in the corporate form. As enterprises that have flexi-
bility in their form of operation depart from corporate status, Congress can be expected
to recapture them through a reduction of the two-tier bite.
'9 See Blanton v. Conmissioner, 379 F.2d 558, 558 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam),
affg 46 T.C. 527, 530 (1966). A different outcome would result if, before receiving
compensation, A had bound herself contractually to return her salary to the extent that
it might be held nondeductible by X. See Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 C.B. 50, 51; see
also B. BITrKER & J. Eus'ncE, supra note 1, 7.05 (citing decisions involving agree-
ments to refund nondeductible compensation).
20 Oddly enough, there appears to be no case on point. The statement in the text
is somewhat influenced by the sense that the payment by X was a calculated risk and
not really a mistake at all. The traditional approach is to think of X's mistake as one of
law and not of fact, for it concerned the deductibility of the entire salary under the
Code. Such mistakes are generally said to result in the denial of restitution. See 3 G.
PALMER, THE LAW OF REsTrrUTION §§ 14.27, 16.4 (1978) (surveying the general
rule that relief will not be given for mistake of law).
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ally requires from taxpayers is unsettling. It is unconvincing, moreover,
to argue that a penalty is fitting because it cleverly discourages taxpay-
ers from claiming excessive deductions and from playing the audit lot-
tery. For example, suppose that B were in a higher tax bracket than A
and the Commissioner sought to recharacterize this transaction as in-
volving the following: a $200,000 salary, a $408,000 corporate tax, and
then a lopsided $792,000 payment by X to B followed, for the sake of
nominal completeness, by a gift from B to A. The defects in this last
recharacterization do not appear to be overcome by the cleverness of a
large penalty. On the contrary, in the absence of legislative authoriza-
tion, the imposition of penalties is too arbitrary a guide for recharacter-
izations because the possible penalties are virtually unlimited.
Some of the criticisms of (b) may be avoided simply by regarding
all of the $400,000 paid to A as salary as originally cast but by insist-
ing that only $200,000 is deductible under section 162(a) of the Code,
which grants a deduction for "a reasonable allowance for salaries."21
Such an approach is consistent with the view that this particular lan-
guage represents a form of sumptuary legislation intended to discourage
excessive expenditures by employers and, through a trickle-down effect,
by employees. Approach (b), then, has two requirements: first, a belief
that, even absent legislative declaration, 2 there is such a thing as a
taxable salary that is simply not deductible to the payor, and second,
either a constrained conception of completeness, or a taste for focusing
on ends rather than means. The Commissioner's own apparent prefer-
ence for recharacterization (c), below, rather than for (b) may indicate
that even the Commissioner regards (b) as too incomplete a
23
(c) Regard X as paying A a nonexcessive $200,000 salary
21 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982).
22 The provision was originally enacted not to limit deductibility, but to authorize
deductions greater than amounts actually paid out, see Griswold, New Light on "A
Reasonable Allowance for Salaries", 59 HARV. L. REV. 286, 287 (1945); therefore,
there is little to gain by focusing on the statutory language. Note, by way of compari-
son, that in other tax systems, statutes do explicitly categorize excessive salary pay-
ments so that they are nondeductible to the payor but taxable to the recipient. See, e.g.,
BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO, BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN JAPAN A-32 (1984)
(describing article 35(1) of the Japanese Corporate Tax Law).
2 The Code can be read as leaving room between that which is reasonable under
§ 162(a) and that which is a dividend under § 301, but courts have not declined to
find non-pro rata constructive dividends. See, e.g., Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Commissioner,
503 F.2d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming the Commissioner's decision that bonuses
paid to officer-stockholders were not deductible business expenses); W.T. Grant Co. v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 290, 309-10 (1972) (concluding that net dividend credits under
an employee stock purchase plan constituted deductible compensation). The same is
true of cases involving benefits in a form other than salary. See, e.g., 58th Street Plaza
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and as distributing a $330,000 dividend to A and to B. View
the excess salary paid to A as an extra $200,000 dividend
from X to A.24
The Commissioner collects an extra $68,000 from X because there
is no deduction for dividends paid, and the money received by A and B
is all salary and dividends. The total tax bill is $704,800 (34% of
$1,200,000 profits from X, and 28% of the sum of $200,000 in A's
salary, $660,000 in dividends, and $200,000 in the extra dividend), as
in (b).
In the absence of explicit statutory instructions to treat excessive
salaries in this manner, this recharacterization is perhaps the most
shocking. An important piece of this approach is, after all, illegal under
state law because it involves a non-pro rata dividend payment. In the
framework developed thus far, (c) might be branded as incomplete be-
cause no explanation is given as to why B would consent to the transac-
tion described. In the absence of such an explanation, it might be pre-
sumed that B acted generously; however, this type of behavior is known
as a gift and generates less tax revenue. 5 The remaining approaches to
Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 724, 725 (2d Cir. 1952) (recharacterizing a
low rental price of property to one shareholder as a constructive dividend even though
this implied non-pro rata treatment). These courts do not, however, address the non-
pro rata problem.
This discussion does not intend to suggest that the Commissioner or the courts will
never select the recharacterizations outlined in (a) or (b). In Peacock v. Commissioner,
256 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1958), for example, approach (a) was chosen. See gener-
ally cases collected in S. SURREY, supra note 11, at 305-10; see also Richards v. Com-
missioner, 111 F.2d 376, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1940) (following (a) by characterizing sole
shareholder's use of corporation-owned homes as a gift).
For decisions that follow (b) and deny salary deductions but do not follow through
with any characterization of the benefit received by the distributee, see, e.g., Mosby v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1154, 1155-56 (1984) (disallowing the recharacter-
ization of compensation as a dividend by the taxpayer whose corporation had no earn-
ings and profits); Woesner Abstract & Title Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH)
722, 724-25 (1983) (denying a closely held corporation a deduction for excessive com-
pensation to the chairman of the board).
24 A number of cases have taken this approach. See, e.g., H.H. Mink & Son Bag
Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 778, 785 (1970) (characterizing a non-pro
rata distribution for reimbursement of disallowed travel and entertainment expenses as
a constructive dividend); Ernest V. Berry Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH)
1077, 1084 (1964) (recharacterizing excessive salary as a dividend); see also American
Foundry v. Commissioner, 536 F.2d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 1976) (Commissioner arguing
for a non-pro rata dividend recharacterization, but court finding compensation not ex-
cessive); Garrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 281, 286-87 (1966) (recharacterizing non-
pro rata bonus as a distribution in liquidation). Again, the non-pro rata character of
these "distributions," noted presently in the text, see infra note 25 and accompanying
text, is not addressed in these decisions.
25 Outside of the framework developed in the Article, (c) is unattractive simply for
incorporating an illicit step. The expression "unattractive" is used rather than "wrong"
because, as a matter of law, nothing prevents federal statutes or commissioners from
1988]
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this excess salary problem are designed around this flaw in recharacter-
ization (c).
(d) Insist on a pro rata approach. Allow only $200,000 of
the salary from X to A and collect $408,000 in corporate tax.
Characterize the remaining $792,000 as distributed pro rata,
$396,000 to each shareholder. Finally, complete the
recharacterization with a gift of $66,000 from B to A in or-
der to leave B with what she actually received, $330,000.
This approach employs what might be called an "equal treat-
ment" recharacterization rule. The equal treatment notion can be un-
derstood at two levels. First, it suggests that when a dividend distribu-
tion is part of a recharacterization, that distribution must conform to
the norms of corporate law and treat all shareholders equally. A more
powerful version of the equal treatment principle would insist that
whenever money or property that is not clearly in return for services or
goods received flows out of a corporation, it should be characterized as
distributed pro rata to all shareholders. This second version will be
called the equal treatment rule of recharacterization, for the first ver-
sion is little more than an objection, albeit a powerful one, to one
recharacterization of one type of transaction, specifically the approach
illustrated in (c). Moreover, a recharacterization that incorporates a
non-pro rata dividend distribution can simply be regarded -as illicit or
as incomplete for failing to explain why other shareholders do not ob-
ject to the non-pro rata payout.
Although the more powerful version of the equal treatment rule
might be applied to a variety of transactions, it will not prove to be a
useful, positive rule in understanding tax law. In some contexts, the
second, more powerful version of the equal treatment rule is little more
than an application of the completeness notion because non-pro rata
sales or redemptions of stock, unlike dividends, are not by themselves
implausible at all. For example, an approach to A's excessive salary
that described a sale by A of shares of X stock back to X as the means
by which A received her second $200,000 is not by itself implausible or
illicit because, by returning shares, A gives appropriate consideration
for her money. It is, however, incomplete because it is at odds with an
important observable event, namely, A's continuation as a 50% share-
instituting rules about the deductibility of payments that happen to be identical to those
that would apply to a series of transactions that contained one step that was illegal
under state law. On the other hand, taxpayers might well avoid the treatment suggested
in (c) by stressing its "unattractive" feature. Regardless, it is useful at this stage to note
other approaches to the excess salary problem; the remaining recharacterizations are
designed to avoid the distribution of a non-pro rata dividend.
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holder of the firm. The fact that this recharacterization is not attempted
by litigants may reflect its unacceptably light tax consequences2" or,
perhaps, the predictive utility of the completeness rule. One might try
to bolster this sale-of-stock recharacterization, in which A's excessive
salary is regarded as the proceeds of a redemption of some of A's stock
by X, by demanding that A actually surrender the appropriate number
of shares of X stock and become a less substantial shareholder. While
this modification would make the recharacterization complete because
A would become a smaller shareholder than B, it attributes to the gov-
ernment too powerful a tool, namely, the ability to require reshuffling
of stock ownership. The common law of tax and the Code itself, after
all, normally limit their reach to the relationship between a taxpayer
and the government. A tool that seeks to change the relationship be-
tween one citizen and another by altering stock ownership seems
inordinate.
The equal treatment recharacterization in (d) is incomplete be-
cause it is contradicted by observable events.27 Viewed from a pre-tax
perspective, which as discussed earlier, is the correct vantage point from
which to judge these recharacterizations,28 (d) leaves B with $330,000,
or just what B enjoys in actuality. On the other hand, A actually re-
ceives $400,000 in "salary" plus a $330,000 dividend. Recharacteriza-
tion (d), however, describes A as receiving not $730,000, but $662,000
($200,000 in salary plus a $396,000 dividend plus a $66,000 gift). The
discrepancy of $68,000 is no mystery; (d) describes X as paying a tax
that is $68,000 larger than that actually paid. Therefore, unless X is
pushed into debt, it is impossible to leave both A and B in the positions
in which they are actually observed. In short, the financial conditions of
the shareholders in this recharacterization depend on X's tax
payments.29
One way to avoid this contradiction or incompleteness is to picture
26 Even if A's stock basis is very low, the refund that will be owed to A will offset
the extra revenue collected from X.
27 One might wonder at this point whether any recharacterization is complete. It
might seem, for example, that no recharacterization involving a redemption of shares
could be complete because the number of shares outstanding in reality will then contra-
dict those remaining in the recharacterization. It is appropriate to distinguish away
such trivial kinds of incompleteness. Stock splits and reverse splits are so easy to man-
age that a contradiction about the number of shares outstanding is much less significant
than, for example, a contradiction about the relative holdings of these shares. This
Article will examine numerous recharacterizations that are quite complete and will
occasionally indicate where stock splits could be added to polish otherwise complete
recharacterizations.
28 See supra text following note 16.
29 Although this vantage point has been discouraged, note that a post-tax perspec-
tive will also not yield a complete recharacterization.
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X as worrying about its taxes only later in time. Consider the
following:
(e) X paid $200,000 to A as salary. Although it had assets of
only $792,000 remaining after-tax, X then distributed
$860,000 in dividends. B gave $100,000 out of her $430,000
dividend to A as a gift.
This recharacterization is complete with respect to all financial
data: X pays out $1,060,000 to its employee and shareholders, A is left
with $730,000 ($200,000 plus $430,000 plus $100,000), and B is left
with $330,000. These three totals match those that are actually ob-
served. Once again, no attempt is made to match the after-tax reality,
for the starting point of the exercise is to deny X the excessive deduc-
tion and then to collect more tax."0
That this recharacterization requires X to borrow money or to
commit future revenues in order to pay the tax and dividends"l con-
tained in (e) is not terribly troubling in itself because such financing is
sometimes utilized in reality. 2 Approach (e), however, can be faulted
as incomplete for failing to include an important piece of evidence re-
garding X's behavior, despite the fact that (e) is complete as to financial
data. X's actual behavior can be characterized as distributing all after-
tax profits as dividends, a strategy that is the paradigm of virtue in a
two-tier corporate tax system. The approach in (e), however, character-
izes X as paying out $860,000 in dividends when its after-salary, after-
tax profits were only $792,000. A skeptic could argue that one does not
know X's intentions and that it is pointless to look beyond the money
actually distributed in order to discern a dividend strategy. On the
other hand, it is probably more accurate to imagine X as having sig-
nalled that it will distribute all after-tax profits to its shareholders in
the form of dividends than it is to insist that X planned to distribute
$660,000 regardless of its financial state. Viewed in this manner, (e) is
as incomplete as (d), although (e) contradicts a behavioral, rather than
a financial, event.
" Once again, to match post-tax reality would be to accept as given the total bill
as drawn by the taxpayers.
"i This assumes away the possibility that some part of the dividends paid may be
recoverable from the directors of the corporation who may have violated whatever sol-
vency standard state law has established for such payments. For a discussion of limita-
tions on dividend distributions, see W. CARY & M. -ISENBERG, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON CORPORATIONS 1335-1403 (5th ed. 1980).
32 When X, for example, mistakenly underassesses its tax liability, pays out large
dividends, and then discovers a remaining tax liability, one assumes that X is expected
to dip into its reserves or borrow in order to finance its obligation. See recharacteriza-
tion (f), infra at text preceding note 33.
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, Only a more aggressive and perhaps absurd recharacterization can
achieve completeness with respect to both financial and behavioral
observations:
(f) Imagine X as paying a $200,000 salary, somehow mistak-
enly paying $340,000 rather than $408,000 in taxes, and
paying out its apparent after-tax profits of $860,000 to A
and B. Only later does X realize its error and send $68,000
more to the Internal Revenue Service, some of which X must
borrow or draw from reserves. Complete the transaction
with a gift of $100,000 from B to A, leaving B with the
$330,000 and A with the $730,000 they enjoy in reality.
This approach is complete. Inasmuch as the tax consequences of
the "error scenario" illustrated in (f) are no different from those gener-
ated by (e), there is little reason to pursue this recharacterization strat-
egy. If (f) is not perceived as any more arbitrary than its competitors,
then it illustrates a general trait of recharacterizations: stories that are
complete with respect to observable financial data can be modified and
made complete with respect to behavioral events. On the other hand,
because the incorporation and subsequent correction of an error makes
a recharacterization such as (f) less brief, or just too absurd, and brev-
ity is either normatively attractive or turns out to be predictively useful,
one may prefer to choose between completeness with respect to finan-
cial data and completeness with respect to observed behavior."3
Even though litigants, including the Commissioner, have not tried
an equal treatment approach along the lines of (d), (e), or (f), an at-
tempt to develop predictive tools for tax law must conclude that none of
these last three approaches has much chance of success. It would be a
mistake, however, to leave this extended example with the impression
that since (f) is not adopted in tax law, completeness is not a useful
predictive tool. In the first place, completeness i*s more easily attained
and more useful in other settings than it has been in (f).' 4 More gener-
ally, it may be that the rejection-if disuse can be regarded as rejec-
tion-of these equal treatment approaches should be blamed on the fact
that they are not brief. Each of these recharacterizations requires the
extra step of a gift from B to A to achieve any sort of completeness at
all, and (f) is doubly long-winded because it also requires an extra tax
13 It is worth noting that approach (d) is not aimed perversely away from com-
pleteness with respect to financial data. The gift from B to A, for example, may make
(d) more awkward in some sense, but it is included in order to make (d) less incom-
plete. Approach (d) is as complete as it can be, given real nonfinancial constraints.
3' See, e.g., transactions (i), (j) and (k), at infra text accompanying notes 52-62.
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payment. Finally, one might be disinclined to favor (d), (e), or (f) be-
cause each requires B first to receive and then to part with some money
distributed by X. B's bank account is described in these recharacteriza-
tions as overshooting its mark and then backtracking for the sake of
completeness. The recharacterizations are therefore indirect. On the
other hand, given that in reality shareholders often receive dividends
and then reinvest them, thereby initially overshooting their eventual li-
quidity positions, this sort of backtracking is not terribly different from
the legal and behavioral norms of corporations and their shareholders.
In any event, since the role of indirectness as a predictive tool is clearer
in other settings yet to be explored, there is no reason to pursue this
alternative explanation of the lameness of (d) and its cousins.
B. Recharacterizing Stock Redemptions and Bootstrap Acquisitions
1. Simple Redemptions
Perhaps the best known recharacterization problem in corporate
tax law concerns "bootstrap acquisitions," in which a buyer emerges
with full ownership of a corporation that is smaller in size than it had
been in the hands of the seller, or previous owner.3 5 Before exploring
such transactions it is useful to review first the general treatment of
stock redemptions.
Imagine a corporation, Y, with 100 shares outstanding, $150 in
assets, and $50 in its earnings and profits account. 6 If a single share-
holder owned all the stock of Y with a basis, or cost, of $100, and Y
redeemed one-half of its outstanding stock for $75, the tax conse-
quences would be clear. The attempted "redemption" is not non-pro
rata, but is instead equivalent to a dividend.37 The shareholder would
15 See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, 1 9.07 (describing bootstrap
buyouts as those in which acquisition is financed in part with the target corporation's
own excess cash or liquid assets).
36 Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code sets up a two-tier tax on corporate
earnings. In the context of an ongoing corporation, it does this in part by taxing the
recipient's dividend distributions as income, rather than by giving immediate credit for
each shareholder's investment, so long as the distributing corporation's earnings and
profits account-essentially a current and cumulative picture of the corporation's prof-
itability-is positive. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c), 316(a) (1982); I.R.C. § 312(a) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). In the absence of earnings and profits, dividend distributions are ac-
corded exchange treatment, and gain is measured as the difference between that which
is received and the distributee's basis in her stock. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(A) (1982).
37 I.R.C. § 302(b) (1982) (providing for exchange treatment only when the re-
demption either meets the safe harbor of § 302(b)(2), with a 20% drop in ownership
share, or "is not essentially equivalent to a dividend"). The single shareholder still




then have dividend income of $50 and her basis in the remaining shares
would decrease to $75,38 while 's earnings and profits account would
go down to zero.39
This dividend equivalence of a perfectly pro rata redemption is
fundamental and obvious in the framework of subchapter C. When a
capital gains preference or deduction is in place, as was the case before
the Tax Reform Act of 1986,0 it is especially clear that a proportionate
redemption must be treated as a dividend rather than as a sale of stock
entitled to capital gain treatment. Without such treatment, shareholders
could too easily convert all dividends taxed at ordinary income rates
into capital gains by uniformly surrendering a fraction of their shares
at the time of corporate distributions. The repeal of the capital gains
preference, however temporary,' 1 does not leave taxpayers indifferent
as to whether distributions they receive are branded as dividends or as
redemptions entitled to "sale or exchange," or capital gain, treatment.42
Capital gains are still attractive under the 1986 Act not only because
capital losses may be used to offset capital but not ordinary gains43 but
also, and more importantly, because exchange treatment permits the
shareholder to get immediate credit for her basis in the shares re-
deemed. The denial of exchange treatment in a redemption means that
38 See I.R.C. § 301(c)(2) (1982).
See I.R.C. § 312(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Note that if one wants this
rather obvious recharacterization to be entirely complete, it is necessary to imagine a
reverse stock split in which the corporation, which can show that only 50 shares are
outstanding after 50 have been "redeemed," is deemed not only to have paid a simple
dividend but also to have called for every two outstanding shares to become one. See
supra note 27.
40 I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (1982) (28% marginal rate on net capital gains of corpo-
rate taxpayers and 60% deductions on capital gains for individuals). The Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 311, 100 Stat. 2085, 2219 (1986) [hereinafter 1986
Act], eliminated this preferential treatment.
41 Most observers believe that some capital gains preference will reappear. The
return of preferential treatment is foreshadowed by the fact that the 1986 Act left in
place all the definitions and statutory segments associated with capital gains. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-106 (1986) (noting that one reason for
preserving the current statutory structure for capital gains is "to facilitate reinstatement
of a capital gains rate differential if there is a future tax rate increase."); Faber, Capi-
tal Gains v. Dividends in Corporate Transactions: Is the Battle Still Worth Fight-
ing?, 64 TAxEs 865, 866 n.6 (1986) (citing Conference Committee Report No. 841's
reference to possible reinstatement of rate differential). Indeed, the 1986 Act even
added such provisions, as in new § 336(a)'s use of the word "distributee," which
threatens § 1239 in the future. See I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1987); I.R.C.
§ 1239 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). If or when tax rates rise in the
near future, the capital gains preference will surely be thought of as a wise means of
diminishing the "lock-in" effect of the system's recognition requirement.
42 "Sale or exchange" and especially "exchange" are the terms often used in the
Code to signal nondividend treatment. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(A) (1982) ("sale or
exchange"); I.R.C. § 302(a) (1982) ("in exchange").
'3 See I.R.C. § 1211 (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
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the entire value of the distribution is taxed as current ordinary income,
with basis recovery postponed until either a true exchange takes place
or the corporation's earnings and profits account is depleted.44 In short,
if a sole shareholder sells some of her shares back to the corporation,
the Code ignores the paper shuffling involved and simply treats that
which is distributed by the corporation as a dividend. Similarly, if a
corporation has more than one shareholder and it carries out a perfectly
pro rata redemption, one hardly needs the explicit statutory instructions
provided by sections 301 and 302 to decide that the distributions must
be treated as dividends.
Consider, then, the more interesting case of a non-pro rata re-
demption. If corporation Y has two equal shareholders, C and D, and it
redeems out C entirely, many recharacterizations are possible.45 Inas-
much as Y could hardly pay out money without D's approval,4 one
"" Section 302(d) states that a redemption that does not qualify for exchange treat-
ment under § 302(a) shall be treated as a § 301 distribution, see I.R.C. § 302(d)
(1982), and under the dividend rules of § 301(c), money received to the extent of cor-
porate earnings and profits is first treated as income and is only later treated as a
return on investment, with recovery of basis, after the earnings and profits account is
depleted.
5 Taxpayers cannot simply recharacterize after the fact and expect that the pa-
pers they have signed and the chronology they have followed will be irrelevant. A well-
advised taxpayer will, instead, assess the acceptable characterizations in advance and
then act accordingly. Of course, some tax treatments become so acceptable that the
Commissioner or the Code eventually consent to given tax consequences even when
taxpayers' behavior has not perfectly conformed to the recharacterizations associated
with such treatments. See infra note 77 (noting an area in which formalism has come
to matter less over time).
"8 The notion that the remaining shareholder is taxed because the shareholder is
benefited by the elimination of fellow owners is vaguely suggested by Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929), which held that an employee realized
income when his legal obligations were discharged by his employer. One might argue
analogously that Y has a relationship with D not unlike that of employer and that to
the extent that the redemption of C may benefit D by allowing her to become the sole
shareholder of Y, Y has improved D's position much like the employer in Old Colony
improved the employee's position. On the other hand, in the redemption context, C
must surely realize that she is losing out or that D looks forward to a prospective
benefit. One would expect, therefore, that C will extract from D a payment that re-
flected the benefit, if any, of being the sole shareholder. The analogy to Old Colony is
most useful as a way of saying that since an attribution argument rather than evidence
of a receipt was sufficient to trigger taxation, so too in the redemption context, the law
could use C's exit as something to attribute to D as susceptible to taxation. For another
case utilizing the same approach, see Montgomery Eng'g Co. v. United States, 344
F.2d 996, 997 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (holding that a payment to widow of former
executive and shareholder was a dividend to remaining, controlling shareholder because
payment was meant to right the wrong that the remaining shareholder thought had
been done to the widow by her husband). As this citation suggests, it is not necessary
that one approach be selected and then used even when facts suggest that some other
approach would be more fitting. The appropriate question, instead, is which character-




could recharacterize the non-pro rata redemption as follows:
(g) Imagine D as purchasing C's shares for $75 and Y as
then distributing $75 to its sole shareholder, D, in return for
half of her shares.
Assuming that C's basis was $50, C reports a capital gain because
of the $25 in appreciation of Y stock in her hands. D reports $50 of
income, which wipes out Y's earnings and profits account, and D
reduces her basis in the remaining stock she holds to $100. 4 7 The divi-
dend equivalence of the redemption of D, now a 100% shareholder, is,
as described earlier, fundamental.' Thus, one can view the redemption
of D in the first part of recharacterization (g) as real but yielding divi-
dend income under section 301. Alternatively, (g) can be seen as noth-
ing more than a pro rata dividend under sections 301 and 302, followed
by a reverse stock split in order to leave 50 shares outstanding and to
achieve completeness for the transaction.
An alternative recharacterization would be the following:
(h) Utilize the strong form of the equal treatment idea and
insist that, when in doubt, all corporate distributions should
be pro rata. This approach suggests a distribution by Y of
$75, with C and D each receiving $37.50 in a pro rata re-
demption. C and D must each report $25 of income. Ys
earnings and profits account is eliminated, and the remain-
ing $12.50 reduces the shareholders' stock bases to $37.50. D
can then be characterized as using the $37.50 she has just
received to purchase C's shares, which are-worth exactly
$37.50 after the dividend, resulting in a basis of $75 in all of
D's shares."9
Again, this event can be described either as a normal dividend dis-
tribution followed by a reverse stock split in order to achieve complete-
ness or as a pro rata redemption that is simply "equivalent" to a divi-
dend. The pro rata redemption described above, though, might be
regarded as more brief because there is no need for the additional step
47 D's basis in one-half of her shares at the beginning of the recharacterization
was $50. Her basis in all the shares became $125 after she purchased C's shares for
$75. Finally, the last $25 distributed to D, after $50 of dividend income depleted I's
earnings and profits account, reduced this basis to $100 under I.R.C. § 301(c)(2)
(1982).
48 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
4' This recharacterization was suggested by Marvin Chirelstein in Chirelstein,
Optimal Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of Common
Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 749 (1969).
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of a reverse stock split.
Note that this equal treatment recharacterization, unlike several of
the recharacterizations sketched in Section A of Part II,50 does not re-
quire the imputation of a gift or the inclusion of any other extra step
that would make (h) less brief than (g). In the absence of any evidence
of affection between donor and donee, this ability to avoid a gift scena-
rio may seem especially attractive."1 Two further alternatives follow:
(i) Simply regard C as selling stock to Y just as if she had
sold stock to a stranger. C pays a tax on her gain of $25.
The recharacterization does not touch D; her basis and Y's
earnings and profits accounts remain as they were, at $50
each.
(j) Regard C's departure as a mini-liquidation.52 There is,
then, a gain of $25 to be reported by C, as in (i), but Y's
earnings and profits account is diminished to $25.
Given that no corporate level tax is at issue in these recharacter-
izations, either because I's assets are presumed to be in cash form or to
contain no untaxed appreciation, it is easy for these recharacterizations
to be complete with respect to both financial data and other observed
events. 53 In all these recharacterizations, as in reality, D emerges as the
sole owner of a $75 corporation, and C exits with $75 to spend as she
60 See supra text accompanying notes 11-34.
61 The presence or absence of relationships that are likely to generate such affec-
tion seems to affect the characterization of cases. Compare Harolds Club v. Commis-
sioner, 340 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1965) (characterization of large salary payment
to nonshareholding father not unrelated to finding that father dominated his sons) with
Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1142, 1160 (1980) (sustaining
taxpayer's deduction of enormous salaries to three officers in setting in which almost
half the stock was owned by persons unrelated to two of these officers, and all or nearly
all was owned by persons unrelated to the third officer).
2 "Mini-liquidation" refers not to a partial liquidation as defined in I.R.C.
§ 302(e) (1982), but rather to an imaginary slice of the treatment offered in I.R.C.
§ 331 (1982); I.R.C. §§ 334(a), 336 (1982 & West Supp. 1987). A redemption of 50%
of a corporation's stock might simply be treated as one-half of a complete liquidation.
The exchange treatment that recharacterization (j) assigns to C is thus simply borrowed
from § 331. The proportional reduction in the earnings and profits account is taken
from the fact that after a complete liquidation (except one carried out under I.R.C.
§ 332 (1982 & West Supp. 1987)), this account disappears entirely. This mini-liquida-
tion recharacterization is inspired by the fact that under prevailing law, earnings and
profits decrease in a redemption. See I.R.C. § 312(n)(7) (Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987) (§ 312(n)(7) was modified in 1987 only to the extent that the section
number changed from § 312(n)(8) to § 312(n)(7); the text of the provision was
unaltered).
6" If a corporate level tax were owed in some of these recharacterizations, then the
problem noted in Section A of Part II arises: the extraction of this tax would affect the
amount of money available for distribution, so that even pre-tax completeness would be
difficult to achieve. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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pleases. Only approach (g) is unnerving in a way that is labeled indi-
rect rather than incomplete. It begins with an unrecognized gain and
ends with an unrecognized loss in D's hands; D had $50 of unrecog-
nized gain, and yet $75 is now taxed. It is odd in aesthetic terms for a
recharacterization to overshoot its mark and then backtrack in this way.
However, because this transaction is explicitly handled by statute, it is
best once more to defer discussion of the predictive utility of this third
recharacterization rule, directness.
The consequences that attach to the redemption of C's stock are
explicitly described in sections 302 and 312 of the Internal Revenue
Code and might be described as patterned on (i) or 0). Section 302
provides that for C the redemption will be treated as an exchange,"
while D, by implication, is left unaffected. Section 312(n)(7) calls for a
proportional reduction in earnings and profits so that Y's earnings and
profits account is reduced by 50% to $25. 5 These treatments are ex-
actly the same as those generated by the recharacterization proposed in
0). One might simply conclude, therefore, that from a set of the four
complete recharacterizations just illustrated, Congress simply chose the
one that was friendliest to taxpayers, and the one which, coincidentally,
did not conform to a strong equal treatment rule.
A minor problem with this conclusion is that section 312(n)(7)
may be motivated by something unrelated to redemptions. Some or all
stock sales might generate, along with the taxes they extract from sell-
ers of stock, a basis step-up in assets held at the corporate level, if only
to avoid the two-tier taxation of pre-incorporation appreciation. Such a
scheme of corresponding step-ups would be administratively difficult to
execute;56 however, when stock is sold back to the issuing corporation
itself, the administrative burden of keeping track of stock sales is
lighter, and a reduction in earnings and profits may be a convenient
proxy or substitute for such a rule. 7 This tangential argument sug-
54 See I.R.C. § 302(b) (1982).
51 See I.R.C. § 312(n)(7) (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
" Even apart from administrative difficulties, one could never simply give an x%
step-up in return for an x% stock sale, for this creates a "correspondence fallacy." The
fallacy is that gain may be recognized where it is subaverage-because of high basis,
for instance-while the step-up is then taken on assets that are average. See Levmore,
The Positive Role of Tax Law in Corporate and Capital Markets, 12 J. CORP. L. 483,
496 (1987). This fallacy is mitigated in our system by giving such corresponding treat-
ments only when 80% recognition events are involved.
" This is true because it is much easier for the distributing corporation to keep
track of its redemptions than for it to monitor the trading of its shares in the market-
place. To the extent that one day a more sophisticated rule might call for a basis step-
up or an earnings and profits reduction corresponding not simply to the percentage of
traded or redeemed shares but to the magnitude of previously untaxed appreciation that
is accounted for in these trades it would again be easier to keep track of this matter in
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gests, but hardly proves, that the earnings and profits reduction called
for in section 312(n)(7) is related to something external to the redemp-
tion itself. Since such an argument is not completely without merit,
however, it seems best to allow for the possibility that the treatment of
redemptions in section 302(a) is as described in (i)-as simply consist-
ing of an everyday sale of stock. Only when such a sale is used to
escape dividend treatment, as when the sale is by a sole shareholder to
her corporation, does the Code deny the normal sale-of-stock
treatment.58
This obstacle to characterizing the nature of section 302's treat-
ment of redemptions is but a small problem in the broader examination
of whether completeness, brevity, and directness are useful tools in pre-
dicting successful recharacterizations. A more serious problem is the fa-
miliar one of interpreting the scope and power of the statute at issue.59
Had the Internal Revenue Code not explicitly addressed the question of
the proper treatment of the complete redemption of a shareholder like
C, C and D might have argued for approach (i) or (), and the Com-
missioner might have sought the tax revenues implicit in (g) or (h). At
some point, the courts would have resolved the matter in favor of a
particular characterization or set of consequences. But when Congress
does choose a result in one setting, as it did in section 302(a), it is not
clear what precedential value that choice provides for courts considering
other recharacterizations.
If, for example, section 302(a) had matched approach (h), would
that mean that approach (d), (e), or (f) was necessarily called for in the
treatment of excessive salaries? One could contend that the equal treat-
ment spirit evinced in the statute should be carried over to other set-
tings. One could argue just as forcefully, however, that by drawing on
(h) in the context of redemptions only, Congress intended that the
equal treatment rule be limited to that context. This question appears
everywhere in law, of course, for virtually no statute addresses every
eventuality.60
the context of redemptions alone.
11 See I.R.C. § 302(b)(1), (b)(2) (1982) (providing for exchange, or capital gain,
treatment when redemption does not have the effect of a dividend and offering safe
harbor of exchange treatment for a shareholder who has less than 50% ownership and
whose ownership share, after attribution from related parties, is less than 80% of what
it was prior to redemption).
11 See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)
(skeptically noting the available and opposite forces of "thrust": "[a] statute cannot go
beyond its text," and "parry": "[tlo effect its purpose a statute may be implemented
beyond its text").1* See Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L.
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In order for a court to determine whether the language of a tax or
any other kind of statute possesses centripetal or centrifugal force, it
should tackle each situation on its own terms and look for the best re-
sult in every instance. If there is a compelling reason for choosing ap-
proach (i) or (j) in the context of section 302 and this reason is applica-
ble in other settings, then this statutory interpretation should be
extended. On the other hand, if a given recharacterization rule is more
attractive than the approach reflected in a statute that is only loosely
related to the matter at issue, then there is no reason to suppress the
attraction. In the latter case, it is reasonable to argue that the statutory
solution should be confined within the borders it establishes.61
2. Bootstrap Acquisitions
Assume that C owns all the stock of corporation Y and decides to
sell her interest to D. If D has only $75, C might still depart with $150
if Y shrinks to one-half its former size. Such a transaction is commonly
known as a bootstrap acquisition because the target corporation, Y, as-
sists in the purchase of itself. Very different tax treatments attach to
such a transaction, depending on whether the recharacterization incor-
porates the equal treatment rule and whether the buyer is introduced at
the outset or at the conclusion. Imagine the following
recharacterization:
(k) C first sells one-half her Y stock to D for its fair market
value, which is $75. Y then redeems C's remaining shares for
$75.
In this plan, C has a capital gain of $25 and D's basis in her new
stock is $75 as a result of the stock purchase by D. As a consequence of
the redemption, C reports another $25 gain under the exchange treat-
REV. 456, 469 (1950) ("Until each. problem arises, a statute has no full meaning.").
"1 It is unrealistic or even wasteful to wait for clear statutory language on every
matter. Compare Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA.
L. REV. 563, 568 (1983) ("Until the legislative branch acts, courts do what they think
wise, or, where possible, what they discern to be legislative policy.") with Isenbergh,
Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CH. L. REv. 859, 879-83 (1982)
(reviewing B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs
(1981)) ("extrastatutory or remedial forays by the courts in tax cases" provide "a fertile
source of bad law"). Although consistency among decisions made by groups may at
times be difficult, see Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
802, 811-13 (1982), it is not pointless, see Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 1553, 1583-84 (1974). There is much to be said about the definition of
consistency and the intuitive sense of what constitutes contradiction. The strategy in
this Article is to introduce the rough notion of consistency as a useful positive tool in
tax law but to reserve a more detailed exploration of consistency in tax, and perhaps in
other law, for a future effort.
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ment of section 302(b)(3), and Ys earnings and profits account is re-
duced to $25 under section 312(n)(7). Since (k) does not extract a tax
early in the recharacterization, completeness in this recharacterization
is easily attained. C actually emerges with $150 pre-tax, while D
spends $75 and is the sole owner of a $75 company. The recharacter-
ization is thus complete, and the stock sale and redemption are at prices
that fairly reflect the value of Y.82 Alternatively, the next variation is
also possible:
(1) Starting the transaction as in (k), C sells one-half of her
stock to D for $75. C has a gain on this exchange of $25 and
D's basis in her new Y stock is her purchase price of $75.
Now, following the equal treatment suggestion that all am-
biguous distributions out of a corporation be characterized as
occurring pro rata, imagine Y as redeeming $37.50 of stock
from each shareholder. Finally, C sells her remaining shares
to D for their fair market value of $37.50.
The dividend equivalence of this pro rata redemption is funda-
mental and, as a statutory matter, is compelled by sections 302 and
301.63 C and D report $25 of income each because there was only $50
in Y's earnings and profits account. Each shareholder then reduces her
basis by $12.50: C's basis drops from $50 to $37.50, and D's basis
drops from $75 to $62.50."4 When C sells her remaining shares to D,
these shares are worth $37.50 because they represent one-half of a $75
company. The sale price only allows C to recover her basis, and it
raises D's basis in all her shares to $100. Y, of course, is now worth
$75. At some point in the future, D will have a $25 loss to recognize.
The equal treatment style of recharacterization (1) is still attrac-
tive. The unrecognized loss to D, however, smacks of artificiality. The
recharacterization has increased tax liabilities and continues to satisfy
the requirements of completeness only because the government will owe
money to D in the future. If the approach in (1) had actually extracted
tax payments and concluded with the government's owing a refund to
D, this sort of objection would be stronger still. The notion of indirect-
ness, introduced at the outset of this Article with the metaphor of ex-
82 These results are both incorporated in recharacterization (k). See infra note 83
for a complete variation of (k) that is even more attractive from the taxpayers'
perspectives.
83 See I.R.C. § 301 (1982 & West Supp. 1987); I.R.C. § 302 (1982).
s, See I.R.C. § 301(c) (1982). Approach (1) could have simply called for a pro
rata dividend distribution rather than an equivalent redemption, but completeness




tremely circuitous travel and further illustrated in (g) above,6 5 reflects a
sense that such artificiality is too forced for tax law. In the context of a
tax system that seeks eventually to have all gains and losses recognized,
it is strange to recharacterize in a way that begins with both an unrec-
ognized gain and no unrecognized losses and ends with an unrecognized
loss. Approach (1), after all, does not simply incorporate an unrecog-
nized loss or gain; it begins with an unrecognized gain, overshoots its
implicit mark of complete recognition, and then later backtracks to this
mark.
The approach described in (I) is also indirect in its description of
D's financial commitment to Y. D invests $75, receives $37.50 in return,
and then invests this $37.50 by purchasing C's remaining shares. As
noted earlier,66 this sort of backtracking is not unusually indirect be-
cause shareholders often receive dividends and then reinvest in the dis-
tributing corporation.67 A cynic might say that what is really inexplica-
ble is not the backtracking, but the voluntary declaration of heavily
taxed dividends in the first place. Given that corporations do declare
dividends and that some shareholders do reinvest these distributions and
pay tax on the turnaround, it is possible to distinguish (1)'s back-
tracking with respect to unrecognized gains and losses from the back-
tracking path of D's financial commitment. This distinction would jus-
tify labeling the first pattern alone as indirect.68
If this distinction holds, it is arguable that (1) is a poor testing
ground for the rule that successful recharacterizations are direct be-
cause the backtracking that (1) requires is the product of an explicit
congressional decision, which signals very little about the resolution of
problems not explicitly legislated. 9 In other words, the descriptive util-
ity of a positive tool may be best judged with respect to common law,
rather than with respect to statutory results such as the approach in
(l).11 The unrecognized loss that materializes in recharacterization (1),
65 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
66 See supra text following note 34.
6 7 Although § 305(b) appears internally indirect by regarding a change in conver-
sion ratios as a distribution with respect to stock followed by a reinvestment, see I.R.C.
§ 305(b), (c) (1982), in reality, this hardly weakens the notion of indirectness. Such
rules are necessary to prevent complete avoidance of dividend taxation. Similarly, this
Article searches for a positively useful core of the indirectness idea. See also supra note
17 (distinguishing statutory from judicial decisions as material for positive theories).
68 This Article will later address whether this label is a useful one. See infra text
accompanying notes 82-84.
69 See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
o Some positive tools are aimed at legislative results. In some settings, the statu-
tory constraints can be accepted as externally given, and litigants, courts, and theorists
can be understood as making law and sense out of nonstatutory decisions. When courts
must fill the gaps between statutory constraints, however, parties become able to
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after all, is a direct product of our peculiar two-tier corporate tax sys-
tem. When, for example, a corporation with negative or zero cumula-
tive earnings and profits but positive earnings and profits in the current
year makes a pro rata distribution, its shareholders must report income
for the current year even though this distribution depletes the corpora-
tion's assets in such a way that a subsequent sale by the shareholders of
their stock would allow them to recognize losses." It is thus rather
common in our tax system to see backtracking with respect to recogni-
tion of income and loss at the shareholder level. Hence, when a divi-
dend generates an unrecognized loss, as it does in (1), labeling as indi-
rect the recharacterization of which this dividend is a part may not
prove useful. Since recharacterization (1) is arguably indirect, it is use-
ful to examine other recharacterizations of bootstrap acquisitions.
(m) D first purchases all of C's shares, and Y then redeems
one-half of its shares from D. C has a capital gain of $50.
The temporary basis of the Y stock in D's hands is equal to
D's purchase price of $150, and there is a $75 dividend to D.
This is a dividend because the distribution to her as sole
shareholder is fundamentally equivalent to a dividend. Re-
ceipt of this dividend requires D to report $50 of income,
reducing I's earnings and profits account to zero, and then
reduces D's stock basis by $25 to $125, although this stock is
worth $75.
Although the severe treatment of D in recharacterization (m) fol-
lows from the idea that Y has satisfied D's debt to C or otherwise im-
proved D's position, 2 the large unrecognized loss in D's hands73 makes
recharacterize transactions in ways that vary with the given statutory constraints. The
predictive value of recharacterization rules, therefore, should be judged with respect to
common law, rather than legislatively mandated results.
The expression "common law" as used here is meant only to distinguish judicial
from legislative results and not common law from civil law. Indeed, even a more stat-
ute-based or "civil law" system would still require that interpretative rules fill the gaps
between statutes, and it might also provide fertile terrain in the search for recharacter-
ization rules.
71 Imagine, for example, that W corporation with $300 in assets loses $50 in its
first year, earns $50 in this its second year of operation, and is owned by sole share-
holder A who has a basis of $300 in her W stock. If W now declares a dividend of $50,
A will have $50 of ordinary income under § 301(c)(1) because of § 316(a)'s "nimble"
dividend rule, and her basis in the W stock will remain at $300. See I.R.C.
§§ 301(c)(1), 316(a) (1982). After the dividend, however, W contains only $250 in
assets, so that if W is liquidated or A sells her stock for $250, A will recognize a $50
loss.
72 See supra note 46.
y is worth $75, and, yet, D's basis in all the outstanding Y stock is $125, yield-
ing an unrecognized loss of $50.
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this approach quite indirect. D begins with no investment in Y, in-
creases her investment to $150, and then becomes a $75 investor. The
volatility in D's financial commitment to Y, moreover, is not analogous
to a dividend reinvestment plan.74 Despite its indirectness, (m) may be
a worthwhile recharacterization. The predictive value and normative
power of indirectness remains, of course, to be demonstrated. 75
The indirectness in recharacterization (m) can be eliminated by
reversing the order of its components:
(n) Y first redeems one-half of C's shares, and then D
purchases C's remaining shares. C reports income of $50 be-
cause the "redemption" is perfectly pro rata, and $25 goes
toward reducing her stock basis to $75. As a result, there is
no gain on the sale to D and no gain or loss remaining to be
recognized.
Approach (k) was affirmed in the well-known case of Zenz v.
Quinlivan,76 a decision to which the Commissioner has acquiesced.7 It
7" Earlier examples of indirectness involved the familiar and seemingly indirect
pattern of dividend reinvestment in which a shareholder receives a dividend and then
immediately reinvests it. Here, however, D does not reinvest that which she receives in
the dividend distribution. See supra text following note 34 (discussing the backtracking
involved in dividend reinvestment).
75 See infra text accompanying notes 158-159.
76 213 F.2d 914, 917-18 (6th Cir. 1954) (permitting the form chosen by a tax-
payer in a bootstrap acquisition to prevail and yield only capital gain, or exchange,
treatment to the departing shareholder).
7 See Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2 C.B. 167, 168 (following Zenz under the 1939
Code); Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223, 224 (following Zenz under the 1954 Code
at least for complete departures of the selling shareholder). A taxpayer whose transac-
tion resembles (m) or (n) in form may be treated as receiving a dividend. The Internal
Revenue Service now willingly gives the favorable treatment accorded in Zenz when the
redemption is undertaken before the sale, so long as the steps are part of an integrated
plan. See Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113, 114. Outside this narrow range, formal-
ism can still be determinative. In Television Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d
322 (2d Cir. 1960), a dividend resulted to the incoming shareholder exactly as it would
in (m), above, because he borrowed money to complete the purchase of all the shares
and then had the corporation redeem some of his shares in order to repay the loan. See
id. at 324. The best argument against such formalism is that badly advised taxpayers
alone will suffer. This is especially interesting and puzzling because corporate tax law
is often devoid of such formalism, as the above revenue ruling illustrates.
The fact that the formal ordering of events in Zenz need not be followed at least in
some situations in order to achieve the tax consequences of Zenz hardly detracts from
the idea that these tax consequences once depended on the order in Zenz; formal re-
quirements are only relaxed because formal order could have been followed. For a
survey of when formalities are required in situations related to Zenz, see S. SURREY,
supra note 11, at 556-64.
On the other hand, a corporate seller or buyer that prefers dividend to exchange
treatment because of § 243's intercorporate dividend exclusion, see I.R.C. § 243(a)
(1982) (amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, § 10221(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1330, -
408 (1987)), is normally unable to style its transaction according to (m) or (n) and enjoy
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is a complete approach to bootstrap acquisitions but so are the other
approaches just sketched. As a semantic matter, it is arguable that of
these approaches, (k) alone fails to incorporate an equal treatment no-
tion, for the others depict distributions, whether labeled dividends or
redemptions, as occurring pro rata. This conclusion, however, ignores
the spirit of the equal treatment idea. It suggests a preference for
recharacterizations that not only support the traditional model of distri-
butions to shareholders, but also reflect the notion that corporate ac-
tions require the agreement of a majority of or all affected parties. In
fact, approaches (k), (m), and (n) all seem at odds with the equal treat-
ment idea. Only approach (1) provides equal treatment because the ac-
quired company in a bootstrap acquisition arguably benefits both the
buyer, D, and the seller, C, by paying off the former's debt and by
financing the latter's retirement. Since it is difficult to know which of
these effects is greater, it seems appropriate to characterize the corpora-
tion as financing the buyer and seller equally. Neither the Commis-
sioner nor the courts, however, have shown any inclination to treat
bootstrap acquisitions in the manner suggested by (1). In light of the
predictive futility of any equal treatment approach to the excess salary
problem discussed in Section A of Part 11,7" as well as the legislative
selection of (i) or (j) rather than (h) in a straightforward redemption,7 9
it now seems reasonable to reject the equal treatment principle as a
useful predictive tool for corporate tax law.
The selection in Zenz and in other cases"' of the recharacterization
illustrated in (k) may be attributed to a particular mode of statutory
interpretation. Approach (k) is very much like (i) and (j) in that it is
the complete recharacterization most favored by taxpayers because it
such favorable treatment. See, e.g., Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d
1185, 1195-96 (5th Cir. 1970) (disallowing tax-free dividend treatment in the context
of a presale extraction of earnings and profits by a corporate sole shareholder because
of a fear that such treatment would create a "new horizon of tax avoidance opportuni-
ties"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 393 (1971). Waterman is modeled in recharacterization
(n) because (n)'s pro rata redemption can alternatively be described as a dividend fol-
lowed, if necessary, by a reverse stock split. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note
1, 1 9.07. For a fuller discussion of situations involving corporate distributees, see infra
note 84.
Finally, note the following arrangement:
(o) Liquidate Y and sell $75 of assets to D who will reincorporate them.
Assuming no untaxed appreciation in Y's assets, only C reports a capital
gain.
This approach fails because it is too powerful. A discussion of liquidation-
reincorporation problems, however, is beyond the scope of this Article, although the
four recharacterization rules are quite useful in dealing with these problems.
7 See supra text accompanying notes 23-34.
• See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
s See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, 9.07 (citing cases).
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generates but one light tax. The decision in Zenz can therefore be seen
as a decision to extend the generous statutory approach of section 302
to recharacterization questions beyond the scope of the statute."' One
may be disinclined to make such a sweeping claim about Zenz, perhaps
because such a claim necessarily implies that too many other
recharacterization questions in tax law ought to be resolved in the tax-
payer's favor. Even so, it is still possible to draw several narrower con-
clusions from the selection of (k).
The success of Zenz should generate confidence in the predictive
utility of brevity or directness or both. Approach (1) includes a cross-
sale from C to D and, therefore, contains three steps, while the compet-
ing recharacterizations, (k), (m), and (n), contain but two."2 The brev-
ity rule thus appears more powerful than the equal treatment principle.
Alternatively, one can take the rejection of both (1) and (m) as evidence
that directness is a useful tool because these recharacterizations, in con-
trast to (k), involve backtracking.
Neither brevity nor directness, however, distinguishes (n) from (k).
Each of these recharacterizations is complete, direct, and brief. Al-
though neither conforms to the equal treatment idea, at least neither
incorporates an illicit non-pro rata distribution."' While the tools sug-
gested in this Article will not uniquely predict which characterization
will be chosen by the tax law, they are helpful in narrowing the
possibilities. 4
a' See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
82 If the analysis includes a longer time horizon in the course of which gains and
losses will all be recognized, (1) contains four steps, (m) has three steps, and (k) and (n)
have two steps each.
8" For a discussion of non-pro rata distributions, see supra notes 24-25 and ac-
companying text. Note also that the following variation on the approach in (k), purely
an attempt to outflank Zenz, would surely fail:
(k) Y issues new stock worth $75 to D. Y then redeems all of C's stock for
its fair market value, $150. C reports a $50 gain under the exchange treat-
ment of § 302(b)(3) and Y's earnings and profits account is reduced pro-
portionately by two-thirds to $16.67 under § 312(n)(7).
See I.R.C. § 302(b)(3) (1982); I.R.C. § 312(n)(7) (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp.
1987).
This approach leaves D unaffected and is as friendly to C as is (k) or Zenz. But by
indirectly expanding and then shrinking, Y claims a larger reduction in earnIngs and
profits than was available in (k). This recharacterization clearly fails. Indeed, were it
otherwise, a corporation could always issue new stock and then redeem out the new,
temporary investors as a simple means of depleting the earnings and profits account.
An easy way to think about the disallowance of such shams is to say that they are
quintessentially indirect.
84 Something other than recharacterization rules is also at issue in the choice be-
tween (k) and (n). Generally, an individual shareholder will prefer (k). When C is a
corporation, however, (n) may be preferred because § 243 is then available to exclude
from income all or most of the intercorporate dividend. See I.R.C. § 243(a) (1982)
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C. Characterizing Distributions in the Context of a Reorganization
Another major testing ground for recharacterization rules involves
the receipt of "boot" 85 in the context of a reorganization. Section 356
requires dividend treatment for a distributee if the boot received "has
the effect of the distribution of a dividend," to the extent that "such an
amount of the gain recognized [in the transaction] . . . is not in excess
of [the distributee's] ratable share of the undistributed earnings and
profits of the corporation." 6 Although the Commissioner first sought to
establish that all distributions received by a continuing shareholder at
the time of a reorganization were to be treated as ordinary income so
long as earnings and profits and unrecognized gain were present,"" it is
now universally agreed that the language "has the effect of the distribu-
tion of a dividend" affords exchange, or capital gain, treatment when a
distribution is sufficiently non-pro rata."8
(amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, § 10221(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1330, -408
(1987)). It would be quite astonishing if the tax system permitted taxpayers to choose at
will among various treatments and tax consequences in the absence of a clear legislative
message that such choices were to be permitted. See Jassy, The Tax Treatment of Boot-
strap Stock Acquisitions: The Redemption Route vs. the Dividend Route, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1459, 1475-83 (1974) (arguing that transactions that are of the same economic
substance should be given consistent tax treatment). But see Kingson, supra note 4, at
895 (concluding that "despite the constant talk of substance and the search for economic
benefit, form can permit a seller to achieve capital gain rather than a dividend" (cita-
tion omitted)); Correspondence, The Deep Structure of Taxation, 86 YALE L.J. 798,
803 (1977) (Professor Martin Ginsburg arguing that dividend distribution problems
will not be solved by "tinkering with a definition" and that there are possible reforms
involving elections by taxpayers that may be attractive).
Judges could permit a choice between (k) and (n), and the government could com-
pensate for the resulting revenue loss. Such a choice might seem a bit odd, however, for
it entertains fundamentally different or inconsistent descriptions of what amount to
identical transactions. In any event, no such normative comments about inconsistent
recharacterization approaches are required because courts have had little trouble re-
jecting recharacterizations by corporate sellers resembling (n). See supra note 77. It is
no accident that this development followed Zenz chronologically. Having opted for (k)
in that case, when (k) and (n) would each have been complete, direct, and brief, it may
have seemed inconsistent to accept (n) in later cases. The discussion in the remainder of
Part II suggests that such consistency, that is, the refusal to allow both (k) and (n) to
characterize differently the same sort of transaction, may be a useful recharacterization
rule. If so, nothing suggests that (k) and not (n) was destined to emerge, but there may
be reason to think that (n) could not survive once (k) had been selected.
85 "Boot" refers to consideration other than stock and securities (not in excess of
the value of securities given up in a reorganization) of the corporate parties to a reor-
ganization. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(1), (d) (1982).
88 I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1982).
87 See Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 288-92 (1945); B. BiT-
KER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, T 14.34 (noting influence of "some imprecise state-
ments in" Bedford). The Commissioner formally abandoned this viewpoint in Rev.
Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118, 119-20, and in Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121,
121.
88 The distinction between dividend and exchange treatment survives the 1986
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Imagine, for example, that Y Corporation has assets of $100, that
E is a 10% shareholder of Y with a basis of $8 in her Y shares, and that
Y undertakes a tax-free reorganization with Z, a corporation with assets
of $200. Virtually all of the shareholders of Y receive only stock of Z,
but E, in return for her Y shares, receives $6 worth of the stock of Z
and $4 in cash. E thus gives up $10 in value of Y stock and receives an
equivalent package of cash and stock, which is a bit more than 2% of
the stock of a" company that now contains $296 of assets. This redemp-
tion of E's shares is clearly non-pro rata,8" so that even assuming no
shortage of earnings and profits, the cash received by E is treated as
part of an exchange. E reports a capital gain of $2 because her basis in
the old shares was $8. E's basis in the new Y shares is $6. If the distri-
bution had the effect of a dividend, E would still only report $2 in
income because section 356(a)(2), unlike section 301, limits this divi-
dend treatment to E's gain. E, however, would then be unable to offset
this gain with capital losses. Moreover, if E received preferred stock in
addition to cash, the preferred stock would be tainted under section 306
only if the distribution had the effect of a dividend."0
As a means of exploring the nature of distributions around the
time of reorganizations, consider this merger between Y and Z, but im-
agine now that before the merger, Y has two 50% shareholders, individ-
uals F and G. The deal that is struck between F and G, on the one
side, and Z, on the other, calls for Z to receive all the stock of Y in
Act, although it becomes less important. If the distribution qualifies as part of an ex-
change treatment, then it can be offset by capital losses and may qualify for installment
sale treatment. See Faber, Capital Gains v. Dividends in Corporate Transactions: Is
the Battle Still Worth Fighting?, 64 TAXES 865, 868-69 (1986) (discussing what sig-
nificance the elimination of the preferential treatment of long-term capital gains in the
1986 Act will have in distinguishing between dividend and capital gain transactions).
As the example in the text will demonstrate, the most important post-1986 difference
between dividends and capital gains shrinks in the context of boot distributed around
the time of a reorganization because § 356(a)(2), unlike § 301, limits the dividend
treatment to the gain recognized by the distributee. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1982).
An investor who purchases X stock for $60 one day and receives a pro rata $20
dividend the next day has $20 of income under § 301(c)(1) (1982), if X has enough
earnings and profits. This occurs even though the X stock may go down in value to $40.
The loss recognition must await a future sale. If, instead, X merges with W and the
investor receives W stock worth $40 and $20 in cash, then even if the cash is deemed as
having been received pro rata, there is no dividend to the investor, who has no gain on
the transaction.
8" The text will describe different ways of measuring the extent of a distributee's
disproportionality. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text. It is sufficient to
note here that even if E is pictured as receiving $4 from Y in return for 4% of F's
outstanding stock, rather than money from Z or Y for Z's outstanding stock, she drops
from being a 10% shareholder to a 6/96 or 6.25% shareholder, which easily qualifies
her for exchange treatment under § 302(b)(2). See I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1982).
90 See I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(b) (1982).
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return for $30 in cash and Z stock worth $70. F and G, each with a
basis of $10 in the Y stock, agree to divide equally the two types of
consideration received. The question, once again, is whether the cash
received by F and G in this transaction should be treated as a dividend,
or whether F and G are to have the advantages of capital gain, or ex-
change, treatment. The answer depends almost entirely on whether the
distributions are characterized as made early or late in time, as the
following competing recharacterizations demonstrate.
(p) View the distributions to F and G as occurring before the
reorganization. At that point, F and G each begins with $50
of equity in a $100 entity. After the $30 is distributed, each
shareholder has $35 in a $70 entity.
Inasmuch as each shareholder's ownership percentage has not
dropped at all, the distribution in (p) has "the effect of . . .a divi-
dend."91 Since each distributee has a gain of $40, assuming sufficient
earnings and profits, the $15 received by each is all ordinary dividend
income under the principles of section 301.92 The Commissioner insists
on the approach illustrated in recharacterization (p). 9'
Note that this prereorganization approach does not always pre-.
clude exchange treatment. Suppose, for example, that F and G had de-
cided not to divide equally all the consideration received from Z, but
had instead agreed that F would receive $23 in cash and $27 in Z stock,
while G would receive $7 in cash and $43 in stock. F's drop in Y own-
ership from 35/70, or one-half, to 27/70 would then meet the require-
ments set out in section 302(b)(2) for exchange treatment because her
decrease from 50% to 38.6% exceeds the 20% drop in ownership that is
required.94 F, in this last example, would have $23 in capital gain that
9' Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112, 113.
92 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
'1 See Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112, 113.
9' See I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1982) (requiring, for exchange treatment, that the ratio
which the shareholder's voting stock bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation
immediately after the redemption be less than 80% of the ratio which the shareholder's
voting stock bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation immediately before the
redemption); see also supra note 89 (noting that E's reduction in ownership from 10%
to 6.25% easily satisfies § 302(b)(2) for exchange treatment). Although not all com-
mentators agree that the effect of a dividend under § 356(a)(2) is a matter that must be
judged under § 302 principles, see Rands, Section 356(aX2): A Study of Uncertainty in
Corporate Taxation, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 106-16 (1983), the text proceeds under
the assumption that the tools of § 302 are to be used. Not only do the courts adopt this
strategy, as Professor Rands concedes, see id. at 106, but it is also difficult to see what
other strategy would be appropriate. It is not disturbing that when using § 302 princi-
ples here, a distributee who retains greater continuity of interest is more likely to suffer
dividend income treatment, see id. at 104-05, for this is a familiar pattern in subchapter
C: the more a shareholder exits the corporation, the more exchange treatment is likely.
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could, even in a world with no preferential rates for such gain, be offset
by capital losses and would carry over a basis of $10 in the Z stock she
receives. G's ownership share, on the other hand, actually increased in
this last transaction so that the $7 distribution to her would be ordinary
dividend income.95 G would also keep a basis of $10 in her new Z
shares.
(q) Reverse the order of the events described in recharacter-
ization (p) and view the distributions as occurring
postreorganization.
Had there been no distribution, the reorganized enterprise would
have contained $300 in assets, and F and G would each have held 50/
300 of the shares of an enlarged Z. Assuming that neither F nor G
previously owned stock in Z, a $15 distribution to each shareholder
would drop each ownership share from 50/300 to 35/270, or from
16.7% to 13%. Since exchange treatment under section 302(b)(2) re-
quires only a 20% drop from 16.7% to below 13.3%, F and G succeed
in avoiding dividend treatment. Each has a gain of $15 to report, but it
is not ordinary dividend income.
This postreorganization characterization does not always yield the
taxpayers favorable treatment. For example, had only $13 or less been
distributed by Z to each former shareholder of Y, this recharacterization
would not have included a sufficiently non-pro rata redemption to earn
favorable treatment. Nevertheless, it is clear why taxpayers generally
prefer (q) to (p).9" The presence of additional shareholders in the pos-
treorganization enterprise causes distributions to shareholders who
were part of one prereorganization company to appear more non-pro
rata when viewed post- rather than prereorganization.97
(r) Compare a distributee's ownership share prereorganiza-
Put in terms of broader capital gains arguments, when more cash is received in one
time period, a telescoping argument suggests preferential treatment.
11 Moreover, G's ownership share would exceed 50%. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B)
(1982); infra note 110.
98 See infra notes 97, 108.
This assumes that acquisitive reorganizations are more common than divisive
ones. In a § 355 exchange that is part of a divisive reorganization, there are often
fewer taxpayers in a postdivision enterprise. Accordingly, a taxpayer who receives boot
is likely to wish for recharacterization (p) to be the accepted approach because (p) is a
prereorganization perspective that will more often make the distribution to the taxpayer
appear more non-pro rata. See B. BITrrER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, 13.11 (not-
ing that the automatic dividend treatment of § 356(b) is limited to § 355 distributions
(spin-offs) as opposed to exchanges and that exchanges are evaluated by the criteria of
§ 356(a)(2)). The Commissioner has, in fact, consistently selected approach (p)'s prer-
eorganization perspective in divisions. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121,
122 (distribution to shareholder in split-off transaction treated as capital gain). Profes-
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tion with the share held by that stockholder postreorganiza-
tion and postdistribution.
Suppose, for example, that G receives $5 in cash and $45 of Z
stock, thus failing to qualify for exchange treatment under either (p) or
(q). G's ownership share can be viewed as dropping from one-half at
the outset to 45/270, or 16.7%, at the completion of the recharacteriza-
tion, easily meeting the safe harbor of section 302(b)(2). F, who re-
ceives $25 in cash and $5 in Z stock, starts out as a 50% owner and
emerges with 25/270, or 9.3%, so that she too easily qualifies for ex-
change treatment. This before-and-after comparison, which might be
labeled a "pre with post" recharacterization, seems attractive because,
like section 302(b) itself, it focuses on the change in each distributee's
voting power. In the illustration just encountered, for instance, F and G
may deserve exchange rather than ordinary dividend treatment because
they have relinquished their power to veto corporate decisions. Ap-
proach (r), however, does not seem quite complete. If the distribution to
either G or F takes place before the Y-Z merger, then section 302(b)
requires a calculation of the sort done in (p). If the recharacterization
instead involves a later, postreorganization distribution, then
recharacterization (q) follows the letter of section 302 and contains the
appropriate calculation.
If recharacterization (r) were adopted in judicial decisions, it
would be easy to say that it reflects the spirit of section 302(b), but,
inasmuch as (r) has been tried and has failed,98 it seems useful as a
positive matter to highlight its incompleteness. 9 There is also a techni-
cal objection to the approach in (r): when section 356(a)(2) speaks of
sor Fleming, on the other hand, has suggested that the taxpayer can argue that distri-
butions should always be viewed as coming out of the combination of two entities.
Thus, even if one chooses a postreorganization recharacterization, or (q) view, for ac-
quisitive reorganizations, one could choose a prereorganization perspective in the case
of divisions. See Fleming, Reforming the Tax Treatment of Reorganization Boot, 10 J.
CORP. TAX'N 99, 112-13 (1983).
s See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
9 One commentator has captured the essence of completeness by criticizing (r)
because "[it is of no value to attempt to apply section 302(b)(2) to. . .[the percentage
of ownership] before and . . . after because the two numbers are simply not compara-
ble." Kyser, The Long and Winding Road: Characterization of Boot Under Section
356(aX2), 39 TAx L. REv. 297, 299 (1984). Indeed, recharacterization (r)'s attempt to
dissociate the question of changing control from the nature of a distribution may be a
bit too much like taxpayer attempts to unlink cash from proximate B-reorganizations,
which are normally thought to fail when consideration other than voting stock is used.
Any success that (r) might have in the future would presumably reflect a judgment
about the nature of § 302(b)(2) and would not contradict any of the recharacterization
rules advanced in this Article.
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the "earnings and profits of the corporation,"' 00 the word the may
mean that only one corporation is involved. Recharacterization (r), un-
like (p) and (q), requires that the distributee's relationship with two
corporations, the "pre with post" transaction corporations, be
contemplated.
(s) If the taxpayers can see that the distribution is not large
enough to make (q) useful to them, as when F and G are to
receive and share evenly $26 of cash and $74 in Z stock, then
they might time the distributions in a way that is consistent
with claiming that only one shareholder was redeemed
before, and the other after, the reorganization. °1
Suppose, for example, that shareholder G has capital losses to use
and F does not. Their recharacterization could then incorporate an ear-
lier redemption for F, and a later redemption for G. F's ownership
share will drop from 50/100 (50%) to 37/87 (42%) and will fail to
qualify for exchange treatment because this drop to 42% is insufficient
under section 302(b)(2). Postreorganization, however, G receives $13
and drops from a 50/287 (17.4%) to a 37/274 (13.5%) shareholder,
which does qualify for exchange treatment."' G's gain will be capital
rather than ordinary, and, under section 1211, the gain may be offset
by capital losses.'0 3
Although recharacterization (s) is complete and direct, this "pre
then post" recharacterization probably deserves to be rejected on both
positive and, dare it be said, normative grounds. Whenever shareholders
receive pro rata dividends, an imaginative taxpayer could claim that
selected shareholders were redeemed and then, after some time had
passed, that others were redeemed in a separate transaction. If tax law
requires that paper records be consistent with claims, it should not be
difficult to convince corporations and other shareholders to cooperate
and take turns at winning the prize.10 4 Section 302(b)(2)(D) addresses
this notion by emphatically denying exchange treatment when the "ef-
fect" is of a "series of redemptions resulting in a distribution which (in
the aggregate) is not substantially disproportionate with respect to the
100 I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (1982).
101 See supra notes 45 & 77.
102 Section 302(b)(2) requires a drop below 80% of the former ownership share,
in this case from 17.4% to below 13.9%.
103 I.R.C. §1211 (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
104 Again, the discussion in the text assumes that taxpayer actions and filings must
support, rather than contradict, later recharacterizations, although this is not always
the case.
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shareholder. 1 ° 5 G might claim that, even in the aggregate, the redemp-
tion is disproportionate with respect to other shareholders of Z, but the
spirit of section 302(b)(2)(D) defeats this argument.'0 6 There is no rea-
son why F and G would have agreed to the timing and ordering of the
redemptions in recharacterization (s), other than as an attempt to es-
cape the tax treatment that is specifically contemplated in section
302(b)(2)(D).
The approaches in (r) and (s) have little chance of emerging in tax
law. While recharacterization (s) has not been explicitly rejected by a
court, in part because no taxpayer has proposed such treatment, (r) was
rejected by the Fifth Circuit after its temporary adoption by two district
courts.' 0 7 In contrast, approaches (p) and (q), encouraged by the Com-
missioner and taxpayers respectively, have had some continuing success
in the courts, with (q) enjoying a real edge, but neither has emerged as
dominant.'08
There are five potentially useful arguments for assessing the rela-
tive worth of recharacterizations (p) and (q). First, two technical argu-
106 I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(D) (1982).
106 See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, 1 9.04 (illustrating the use of
§ 302(b)(2)(D) as a weapon against attempts to abuse § 302(b)(2)).
107 See Sellers v. United States, 615 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting
lower court finding that cash boot was the equivalent of a dividend distribution), affg
in part & rev'g in part 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) §§ 78-6195, 78-6197 (N.D. Ala. 1977);
General Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)
(noting that, after Shimberg v. United States, cash distributions in a prereorganiza-
tional context are to be treated as dividend distributions), rev'g 488 F. Supp. 926, 937-
38 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1978)
(reasoning that if prereorganization distribution would be a dividend, merger should
make no difference), rev'g 415 F. Supp. 832, 836 (1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115
(1979). Unfortunately, these reversals were not accompanied by either clear explana-
tions or by the § 302(b)(2)(D) argument sketched above.
108 Compare Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 608-09 (8th Cir. 1973)
(agreeing with (q)'s protaxpayer view and going even further by appealing to
§ 302(b)(1) rather than § 302(b)(2)(B)) and Clark v. Commissioner, 828 F.2d 221,
224-28 (4th Cir. 1987) (affirming tax court opinion that had agreed with the Wright
test and arguing that the redemption notion presupposes a surviving enterprise, but
basing the decision on the "net effect" of both steps) with Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288
(5th Cir. 1978) (pro-Commissioner, (p) approach). A preference for one approach over
the other has not emerged in the tax literature. For citations to commentators favoring
(p) or (q), but doing so before the Clark decision, see Kyser, supra note 99, at 299
nn.14-15. Clark, a decision that toys with using the idea of the order within Zenz,
surely gives the edge to (q) over (p). Unfortunately, the Clark decision focuses on the
"net effect" of the transactions in Zenz and Clark. See Clark, 828 F.2d at 228. "Net
effect," however, cannot be a useful test in corporate tax. It may at first seem appropri-
ate to note that Mr. Clark surrendered a greater than 20% interest in the enterprise he
was joining because he could have taken more stock and less cash than he actually
received. However, when one considers the taxpayer who receives a cash dividend and
then reinvests it in the distributing corporation, it becomes clear that "net effect" is not
a powerful test because the taxpayer surely has dividend income to report even though
the "net effect" of the two transactions is that the taxpayer has received no cash.
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ments can be made. Section 356(a)(1)(B) purports to address a situa-
tion in which "the property received in the exchange consists not only
of property permitted by section 354 or 355 to be received without the
recognition of gain but also of other property or money."10 9 This provi-
sion suggests that the permissible property, which was Z stock in the
earlier example, and the money come from the same place. If so, the
"post" view in recharacterization (q) fits the statute better than (p)'s
"pre" view, because the Z stock obviously comes from Z.
Second, the inquiry called for in section 302(b) seems most natural
when there is a surviving entity in which the distributee's ownership
share can be evaluated. If, for example, a redemption causes the dis-
tributee to drop from a 90% to a' 55% ownership share, the distribution
will normally be found to have the effect of a dividend because section
302(b)(2)(B) gives no effect to a large drop in ownership when the
distributee retains a majority interest.110 It is not surprising to see such
a requirement present in a normal or postreorganization setting, be-
cause a majority shareholder eager to receive exchange rather than divi-
dend treatment may not care what percentage of the stock she owns so
long as her continuing control is ensured. In constrast, it is more diffi-
cult to comprehend the point of this subsection if the "pre" approach is
correct, for control lasts but a moment before the reorganization erases
its power.11'
A third argument favoring recharacterization (q) initiates the final
recharacterization rule of this Article, consistency. The essence of the
rule of consistency is that the order of events within a recharacteriza-
tion should be, as a normative matter, or might be, as a positive matter,
consistent with the order adopted in other recharacterizations in "re-
lated" controversies or areas of law."12 Approach (q) first entails a
change in ownership of a corporation, and then it ends with a corpo-
rate contraction. The Commissioner generally prefers approach (p),
however, which begins with a corporate contraction, since it describes
the distribution of cash as occurring prereorganization. But the Com-
missioner lost in-and eventually acquiesced to-Zenz v. Quinlivan,"3
109 I.R.C. § 356(a)(1)(B) (1982).
110 I.R.C. § 302 (b)(2)(B) (1982) (disallowing exchange treatment unless "imme-
diately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote").
" This argument is found in Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 607 (8th
Cir. 1973).
..2 This quality was discussed earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
Reasonable people can, of course, disagree over which controversies are "related." See
infra note 133 and accompanying text.
113 213 F.2d at 916.
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in which the distribution of cash occurred after a sale of shares brought
in a new shareholder.114 Approach (q) is thus more like Zenz than is
(p), and the decision in Zenz, involving a late distribution, might be of
precedential value to (q).
It is useful to restate this potential link between bootstrap acquisi-
tions and distributions which occur in the context of reorganizations,
first in a purely positive tone and then in practical terms. If Zenz, or
recharacterization (k), remains good law and recharacterization (q)
emerges as the preferred interpretation of section 356(a)(2), consistency
would be a promising recharacterization rule because, in both (k) and
(q), distributions are inserted earlier rather than later in time. Put in
terms of the practice of tax law rather than in terms of positive legal
theory, Zenz may be of precedential value for a taxpayer who wishes to
argue for the exchange treatment associated with the approach in (q).
When the argument is expressed in such precedential language, how-
ever, it becomes apparent that the content of the seemingly innocuous
tool of consistency may depend on the very broad and often political
question of the scope and power of precedent." 5 Like the relevance of a
precedent, the application of consistency is a subjective question. In the
small matter at hand, for example, a reasonable person might argue
that consistency is a powerful positive or normative goal but that the
Zenz-like ordering of a redemption around a sale of stock is simply a
different question from the ordering of a redemption around a reorgan-
ization, as in recharacterizations (p) or (q). Although this Article does
not confront the problem of the coherent meaning of precedent,"' 6 it is
nevertheless noteworthy that Zenz and approach (q) are more easily
seen as consistent than are Zenz and recharacterization (p).
Although all three of the preceding arguments favor approach (q),
approach (p) is not indefensible. From a technical perspective, it can be
argued that (p) best agrees with "the corporation" language in section
356(a)(2)."' Viewed from the vantage point of recharacterization (p),
the statute tells taxpayers like F and G that those receiving money from
Y will qualify for exchange treatment if Y does not have sufficient earn-
114 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
'15 See Deutsch, supra note 61, at 1583-84; Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial
Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REV. 495, 505-10 (1985); Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 571, 602-05 (1987).
116 As an abstract matter, precedent seems to be both a matter of context, see
Deutsch, supra note 61, at 1584, and of shared culture. As an operational matter,
however, one can study decisions and develop views of how broadly, narrowly, or inco-
herently precedents are construed. In turn, one can test one's views about the meaning
of precedent by trying to predict the outcomes of future decisions.
1'" See supra text accompanying note 100.
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ings and profits. This treatment corresponds to the standard mechanics
of dividend distributions found in sections 301(c)(1) and 316.118 In con-
trast, approach (q) complicates the message in section 356(a)(2) by re-
quiring one first to imagine a pure stock-for-stock reorganization in
which Z takes on Y's earnings and profits account and then to calculate
F and G's ratable shares of this newly enlarged account. This is not
impossible, but, at the very least, it is sufficiently inelegant that one
wonders whether such an approach is what the drafters of section
356(a)(2) had contemplated. Furthermore, the extra step required in
recharacterization (q) to calculate the ratable share of earnings and
profits violates the brevity rule, although in a way that is not quite the
same as earlier examples. 19 Approach (q) also appears to be indirect
because Z first increases in size from $200 to $300, and then, by paying
out $30, it subsequently shrinks to $270. In contrast, recharacterization
(p) involves no such backtracking because it simply allows Z to grow
from $200 to $270.
Such a claim regarding (q)'s indirectness, however, is inherently
weak. In approach (p),-while it is true that Z does not backtrack, Y
shrinks from $100 to $70 in size and then grows into a part of a $270
organization. This is just as indirect as Z's growing and then shrinking
in approach (q). If there is a difference between the two maneuvers, it
derives from the assumption that when two entities are combined, it is
the larger entity that is the acquiror, and it is only this larger entity
that should be described in a way that avoids backtracking. In reality,
however, some target corporations shed divisions before being acquired,
while some acquiring corporations shed divisions of targets they have
acquired. The choice between such early and late shrinkages is often
motivated by nontax considerations. Consequently, it is reasonable not
to regard (q) as any less direct than (p). 20 On the other hand, in its
118 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
1 See supra text accompanying note 82.
120 Approach (q) might be regarded as more indirect because, although there are
good reasons for an acquiror, rather than a prereorganization target, to sell off parts of
a company it has purchased (indeed, its comparative advantage may be that it knows
how to divide up an entity and sell some divisions to buyers who can more efficiently
employ their assets or workers), it is hard to think of a nontax reason why the acquiror
would be better at distributing cash. This last argument against (q) still requires as a
starting point, however, the notion that the larger company's progress should be even,
while the smaller one can backtrack. In practice, it is far from clear that either an
acquiror or a target would always have the comparative advantage in locating purchas-
ers for assets that are sold in the shadow of a reorganization. It is therefore fair to label
(q) as barely, if at all, indirect.
Although it may be tempting to look to the rules regarding the "pruning" of un-
wanted assets before a reorganization as a source of inspiration for the (p) versus (q)
controversy because cash can be thought of as an unwanted asset, this perspective is
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rules governing the carryover of losses, the Code does insist on a dis-
tinction, albeit manipulable, between acquirors and targets: losses in a
post-merger entity may generally be carried back for three years to off-
set profits of the acquiror, but not those of the target, earned before the
merger.x2' As a positive matter, therefore, there may be validity to the
claim that (q) is indirect.
In summary, while these five arguments do not point to the clear
superiority of (p) or (q), it can be argued that (q) has an edge. In
purely positive terms, the rejection of approach (r) can be understood as
reflecting its incompleteness, and the implicit rejection of (s) relates to
that recharacterization's contradiction of the spirit of section
302(b)(2)(D). As for (p) and (q), one can regard the still ongoing com-
petition between them as a consequence of the statutory and other ar-
guments on both sides. On the other hand, the combination of Zenz and
(q)'s recent judicial success.22 can be taken as illustrative of the predic-
tive utility of the consistency rule.
D. Consistency in Determining Ownership Shares
One last example brings the consistency idea into clearer focus.
When a corporation is liquidated, there is normally both a corporate-
level tax due under new section 336 on all the previously unrecognized
gain in those assets held by the corporation and a shareholder-level tax
due under section 331 on the difference between the value of the liqui-
dating distributions received by each shareholder and the basis in the
shareholder's stock.'2 ' In the case of a parent-subsidiary or intercorpo-
unproductive because the relevant decisions involve pruning by both acquiring and ac-
quired corporations. See B. BrTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 1, 14.52.
121 I.R.C. § 381(b)(3) (1982) disallows the carryback of postmerger losses to the
profitable history of the target and, by implication, allows such carrybacks to the enter-
prise's own premerger history. This asymmetry stands in contrast to the carry-forward
rules of § 382, which leave selected losses breathing in a way that does not depend on
the identification of one enterprise as the acquiror and the other as the target. See
I.R.C. §§ 382(g), (k) (West Supp. 1987) (providing that the change of ownership trig-
gering the carryover limitations in the provision can involve either the acquiror or the
target corporation). The ability to carry back losses is generally more limited than the
ability to carry forward such losses. See I.R.C. § 172 (1982) (allowing net losses to be
carried forward 15 years but back only 3).
122 See Clark v. Commissioner, 828 F.2d 221, 228 (4th Cir. 1987).
123 If a corporation sells all its assets and then liquidates, there is a two-level tax.
The first is levied as a matter of course when the assets are sold. The repeal of former
§ 337, which once forgave this tax, ensures that there is a tax on the sale of assets. See
I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1987). The shareholder-level tax on the differ-
ence between the liquidating distributions and the basis each shareholder has in her
stock is due under § 331. See I.R.C. § 331(a) (1982). Some small corporations will
continue to enjoy one-tax treatment upon liquidation under former sections 336 and
337. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 633, 100 Stat. 2085, 2278,
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rate liquidation, however, these taxes are not collected under the terms
of section 332, which addresses a corporate distributee or parent that
owns more than 80% of the liquidating corporation,' 24 and new section
337(a), which deals with the liquidating subsidiary on its distributions
to its 80% parent.1 25 The rationale behind these last two rules is that
since appreciated assets remain in corporate form in the distributee's, or
parent's, hands, there is no need to levy taxes at the time a parent
liquidates its subsidiary; instead, when these assets leave the parent's
hands, tax will be collected.128 Section 334(b)(1) thus appropriately
provides that in such a "332 liquidation," the parent-distributee inher-
its the asset basis held by the subsidiary.1 21 In short, a liquidation nor-
mally triggers a two-level tax and generates a step-up in asset basis,
but an 80% parent can liquidate its subsidiary without triggering any
taxes, deferring the tax by carrying over the bases of assets.
What if a parent that owns only 79% of a subsidiary's stock
wishes to liquidate the subsidiary, but defer taxation? If this parent
does not wish to acquire additional shares and then wait a long time
before liquidating the subsidiary, it might try to "back in" rather pain-
lessly to section 332. In order to satisfy the 80% hurdle, the parent
corporation will pause for a moment before the liquidation and either
purchase some shares from the 21% minority shareholders or cause the
subsidiary corporation to redeem a few shares from its minority own-
ers. The Commissioner has objected to this maneuver and has insisted
that the relevant ownership share is that which was in place at the time
the liquidation plan was adopted and before a redemption was engi-
neered.1 28 The Commissioner's objection to what normatively might
(1986).
124 See I.R.C. § 332(b) (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
See I.R.C. § 337(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1987) ("No gain or loss shall be
recognized to the liquidating corporation on the distribution to the 80-percent distribu-
tee of any property in a complete liquidation to which section 332 applies."). Gain, but
not loss, is recognized to the liquidating corporation on distributions to any minority
shareholders. See I.R.C. § 336(d)(3) (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
128 The parent will be taxed under current § 336 and the ultimate shareholder
will be taxed under § 331. The latter is entitled to exchange, rather than dividend,
treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 336(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1987); I.R.C. § 331(a) (1982);
infra note 153 and accompanying text.
127 See I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (1982).
128 See Rev. Rul. 70-106, 1970-1 C.B. 70, 70-71 (holding the nonrecognition ex-
ception inapplicable when the subsidiary redeemed the required shares after the par-
ent's informal adoption of a liquidation plan, even though formal adoption of the plan
occurred after the share redemption). But see Rev. Rul. 75-521 1975-2 C.B. 120, 120-
21 (distinguishing Rev. Rul. 70-106 and allowing nonrecognition when the parent
waits until after purchasing the requisite shares to adopt a liquidation plan). The
adoption of a liquidation plan may be effected formally or informally, as Revenue Rul-
ing 70-106 implies, but "the formation of a conditional general intention to liquidate in
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seem like a harmless scheme is interesting because the backing-in plan
is inconsistent with Zenz!'29 Zenz, once again, described the redemption
or contraction of the corporation as occurring late in a recharacteriza-
tion, during the last step in the sole stockholder's complete transfer of
her business."' 0 In contrast, backing into section 332's 80% ownership
condition requires the taxpayer to describe the contraction as occurring
early, before the liquidation.13'
The predictive utility of the consistency rule is especially enhanced
in this context by the fact that courts have permitted taxpayers to "back
out" of section 332 and into the normal two-level tax and stepped-up
basis liquidation rules associated with section 331."2 If an 80% parent,
wishing perhaps to recognize losses upon the liquidation of its subsidi-
ary, seeks to drop below 80% and escape section 332's nonrecognition
rules, it can either sell a few shares just before liquidating or it can
cause the subsidiary to issue some new shares to unrelated sharehold-
ers. Neither alternative is inconsistent with Zenz. These alternatives are
either best regarded as much like Zenz, in that both involve early stock
sales, or as simply not comparable to Zenz, because backing-out in-
volves no contraction at all.' In short, the decision to permit backing
the future is not the adoption of a plan of liquidation." George L. Riggs, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 64 T.C. 474, 488 (1975).
29 See Zenz, 213 F.2d at 916-18; supra note 77 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the formalistic effect of Zenz); supra text accompanying notes 113-16 (discussing
the post-Zenz context). Note that the Commissioner does not always adopt positions
that maximize the government's revenues.
ISO See 213 F.2d at 916. See also approach (k) at supra text following note 61,
modeling Zenz.
13' To meet the 80% requirement of § 332, the parent must cause the subsidiary
to repurchase some minority owners' shares, if this is the backing-in method chosen,
before liquidation. See supra note 128.
132 See, e.g., Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670, 674 (1st Cir.
1956) (permitting backing-out in order to recognize loss under predecessor of § 331).
Note that it is not the 80% requirement itself that is the subject of this consistency
inquiry, for that is a dividing line used frequently in the Code, but rather it is the
question of whether taxpayers can back into or out of this requirement.
133 In assessing consistency or precedent, if one's aesthetic sense suggests that Zenz
and backing-out concern similar circumstances, then the fact that the taxpayer's success
in Zenz hinged on an early stock sale followed by a complete redemption of the seller's
remaining shares may seem important in precedential terms for policing § 332's own-
ership requirement. Inasmuch as backing-out can also turn on an early stock sale, it
appears quite consistent with or even supported by Zenz. On the other hand, much as
precedential value is often linked to the relevant domain of the earlier decision, here
one could simply shrug and say that Zenz involves a bootstrap acquisition with a mere
contraction by the corporation, while the § 332 backing-out question involves a liqui-
dation. Thus, apples and oranges need not be governed by the same rules.
Were it not for this last argument, it would also seem that backing into § 332
should fail via redemption because Zenz incorporates a later, rather than an earlier-in-
time contraction, but that backing-in need not necessarily fail if accomplished through
the purchase of stock. In the latter case, it is arguable either that Zenz also calls for an
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out of section 332, the decision in Zenz, and the Commissioner's objec-
tion to backing into section 332, taken together, are fair evidence that
the consistency rule is a useful descriptive tool."'
III. NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF THE HIDDEN RULES OF
RECHARACTERIZATIONS
The discussion in Part II presented a systematic approach to as-
sessing the acceptability of recharacterizations of corporate transactions.
This positive theory is "retrospectively descriptive" in that it reveals the
rule structure of past decisions in a way that is, perhaps, convincing
and elegant. The framework is also predictive in that it provides four
rules that may foretell the outcomes of future cases." 5 Every reader of
legal scholarship is familiar with such retrospectively descriptive and
predictive theories. For example, one such theory suggests that the de-
velopment of negligence, as opposed to strict liability, in the law of torts
paralleled the growth of manufacturing in our country. 6 Other de-
early stock purchase or that the backing-in maneuver simply involves no contraction
and is not comparable to Zenz. This line of reasoning should not be troubling simply
because it suggests different treatments depending on the style of backing-in. Because
redemptions are a subset of stock purchases, the most useful way to think about consis-
tency with respect to Zenz seems to hinge on the contraction aspect of bootstrap acqui-
sitions. When backing-in can be accomplished without a corporate contraction, Zenz is
arguably irrelevant.
134 Readers familiar with the evolution of corporate tax law might also wish to
check on the consistency of backing into former § 338(c)(2) and even former § 334(b).
See Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 611, 612-14 (2d Cir.
1974) (allowing backing-in via redemption rather than purchase under § 334(b) of the
1954 Code). See also Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAX L. REV. 177,
293-95 (1983) (noting that the position taken by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 70-106 created
problems under § 338 when the purchased corporation was not liquidated but was
backed into by the purchasing parent).
In these older contexts, the most important determinant was probably not consis-
tency, but a sense that unlucky or badly advised taxpayers should not lose out. The tax
law intended to provide a route to a one-tax result, and backing-in ensured the availa-
bility of that route to the taxpayer who mistakenly redeemed before liquidating.
"" In the taxonomy of positive law theories there are also descriptive theories that
address the future but that are not at all predictive as to individual cases. Theories
based on the psychological profile of the decisionmaker or on the notion that in some
areas of law decisionmaking is a random process are two such examples. These kind of
theories are not addressed in the remainder of this Article for two reasons. First, the
intersection of positive and normative theories can be argued without reference to this
last sort of positive theory. Second, such theories are few in number, and especially rare
in corporate tax law.
131 See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-69 (2d ed. 1985)
("Absolute liability was rejected; more accurately, it was never considered. In the mind
of the 19th century, absolute liability might have been too dangerous; it might have
strangled the economy altogether."); M. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMER-
ICAN LAW: 1780 TO 1860, at 99 (1977) (noting that the negligence standard sup-
planted strict liability first in states having advanced economic development). But see
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scriptive theories assert that damage rules in contract law encourage
efficient but not inefficient breaches13 7 and that restitution claims are
allowed only when recipients benefit unambiguously from the goods or
services rendered. 138 Theories that link exclusions under warranties to
moral hazard problems"s9 or that associate penalties for nonrescue with
countervailing rewards for rescue 4" are predictive as well as descrip-
tive. These last two theories, concerning warranty and rescue, identify
structural reasons for the existence of certain rules,' 4 ' and because
these reasons will persist, the theories predict, at least implicitly, that
results in the future will be much like those in the past. In contrast, the
first three descriptive theories listed above-pertaining to negligence,
contract damage, and restitution-do not, standing alone, make predic-
tive claims about the outcomes of future cases. 4"
While many other positive applications of the tools introduced in
Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpre-
tation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1727-34 (1981) (arguing not only that Horwitz errs in
stating that strict liability had been the established standard of all American torts, but
also that the negligence standard and tort law as a coherent body developed
simultaneously).
"I See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 105-14 (3rd ed. 1986) ("The
duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages
if you do not keep it,-and nothing else." (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897))); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558-59 (1977) (noting that the breacher's
retention of net gains from the breach provides an incentive for efficient breach).
Although the efficient breach theory is not always articulated in descriptive terms,
it forms a powerful descriptive theory of why expectancy damages (and not more) have
emerged in American law and why specific performance continues to be used only in
certain circumstances or in other legal systems. See Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for
Breach of Contract, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 304 (1985) (presenting the choice of
remedy as dependent on a time continuum: "it will be efficient to switch from damages
to specific performance depending on how complete performance is").
138 See generally Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985)
(exploring restitution law's sensitivity to the recipient's valuation of benefits).
139 See Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297,
1313-14 & n.98 (1981).
140 See generally Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 85-
100, 128 (1978) (comparing the predictions of an economic model of rescue to assess-
ments of actual legal outcomes and concluding that economic analysis provides the basis
of a valid positive theory); Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution
and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879,
891-94 (1986) (exploring the different balances of "carrots" and "sticks" available to
influence behavior).
141 Costs are an example of such a structural reason. See Priest, supra note 139,
at 1351-52. Moral hazards are another such reason. Id. at 1313-14.
142 The efficient breach theory can be transformed into a predictive theory with a
claim about the evolutionary efficiency of the common law of contracts, under which
parties can generally bargain around unattractive rules.
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Parts I and II remain to be explored, enough material has been
presented in this Article to turn attention from the practical and predic-
tive utility of these tools to their normative value. Whether a descriptive
or predictive theory143 should be utilized by judges resolving disputes is
an interesting and elusive question. This Article argues that corporate
tax law poses a special case for the consideration of the intersection of
positive and normative concerns and that in determining the acceptabil-
ity of recharacterizations, judges should follow the four rules developed
in Part II.
Positive theories and normative values are sometimes fairly separa-
ble.""' This is especially, or even uniquely, true in corporate tax law
where rules and decisions are almost necessarily devoid of a normative
foundation and are especially arbitrary. Corporate tax law is arbitrary
because, like most of American tax law, it requires a specific recogni-
tion event before it taxes appreciation in asset values145 and because it
regards corporations as taxable entities that are distinct from their
"' If a predictive theory is adopted as a guide for decisionmakers, it will, of
course, become a self-fulfilling theory.
144 A positive theory may be quite convincing even though it is normatively indif-
ferent or unappealing. See generally H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49 (1983) (discuss-
ing the separation of the "positive" law and its normative elements). Thus, a positive
theorist may suggest that the poorer party generally loses or wins in a particular area
of law, see, e.g., Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 103-104 (1974) (noting that the
"position of advantage [enjoyed by repeat players in the legal system] is one of the ways
in which a legal system formally neutral as between 'haves' and 'have nots' may perpet-
uate and augment the advantages of the former."), while normatively believing that the
poorer party should win, or while contemplating that decisions should be based on
some other factor that is not correlated with wealth or poverty, or without having a
normative valuation of the issue at all. Conversely, normative theories can stand almost
entirely apart from positive theories. There may be many strong reasons directing what
the law or a judge should do in a given circumstance, even though it is quite clear that
these ideas have little to do with how existing law has developed and may, indeed, have
no effect on future law. See H.L.A. HART, supra, at 54 (noting Bentham's and Aus-
tin's assertions that morality can neither descriptively nor predictively determine what
law is). Thus, a normative theorist might argue that when no "better" decisionmaking
variable is available, the poorer party should win, or the law should decide the dispute
in some way that can and should be imitated later on because certainty and predictabil-
ity are normatively desirable. These normative arguments do not necessarily lose force
if it is clear that prior law does not follow these suggestions. This discussion later
returns to the "separability" of positive and normative concerns. See infra note 158 and
accompanying text.
'" In the opinion of most economists, the realization requirement implicit in the
Code results in a less accurate measurement of income than an accretion approach
would generate. See B. BITTKER, I FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS 11 3.1.1, 3.5.2 (1981) (discussing the Haig-Simons accretion approach and its
use as a standard for judging the merits of a statutory definition of income). The re-
duced accuracy has customarily been justified by increased administrability. See id.
5.2.
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shareholders.146 These features are best labeled arbitrary, rather than
unfair or inefficient, 47 because it is not entirely clear that alternative
rules would be any more efficient or fair. 4 8 The point is not to "de-
fend" the fundamental rules of the tax system as merely arbitrary, but
rather to note that because these rules are arbitrary, it is virtually im-
possible to develop normative arguments about questions that arise as a
result or in the shadow of these basic starting points. The nature of
corporate tax law often defies normative argumentation.
Consider, for example, the last set of problems discussed in Part
II, concerning the ability of corporate taxpayers to "back into" or to
"back out of" degrees of ownership specified in the corporate tax statu-
tory sections. When a parent corporation owning 79% of a subsidiary
tries to back into section 332, which governs the treatment of a parent
liquidating its 80%-owned subsidiary, by purchasing some additional
shares of the subsidiary just before its liquidation,' 49 it is virtually im-
possible to articulate relevant normative arguments. It is not norma-
tively evident or, more colloquially, it is not clear from a policy stand-
point, why these rules should require a parent to recognize or to defer
gain when liquidating a subsidiary. Indeed, there are in general no ex-
ternally-based reasons to recognize gains at the particular moments
chosen by the Code or, for that matter, to defer gains only when a
parent owns at least 80% of a subsidiary. Deferral and recognition are
not neutral concepts in policy terms. One might, on the margin, prefer
deferral rules because recognition rules discourage those things that
will be counted as recognition events,'5 0 but to permit deferrals is even-
tually either to forgive, which has its own efficiency costs,' 5 ' or to rec-
ognize gains built up over a longer period, which is then a treatment
14' To say that the taxation of corporations as legal entities is arbitrary is not to
suggest that such taxation is necessarily inconsistent with other aspects of corporate
law. The legal personality of the corporation is, of course, one of its practical advan-
tages. See N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 11 (2d ed. 1971).
On economic grounds, the separate taxation of corporations has often been criti-
cized. See B. BITTKER, supra note 145, 3.5.6 ("Most economists . .. regard the
corporate income tax as an anomaly.").
"4" See J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 135-36 (3d ed. 1977) (noting that
the corporate income tax has continually been criticized because of its effects "on in-
vestment and saving, equity and debt finance, resource allocation, the built-in flexibility
of the tax system, and the balance of payments").
148 See Levmore, supra note 56, at 496-502.
14 See supra notes 123-134 and accompanying text.
150 A rule calling for appreciation to be taxed at the time an asset is sold or ex-
changed, for example, tends to encourage the owner to retain possession of the asset
even though, taxes aside, she prefers a sale or exchange. See Levmore, supra note 56,
at 486.
'51 It can also be inefficient to encourage taxpayers to hold on to assets and await




There is, in short, no normative theory or rule that suggests the
optimal number or coverage of recognition rules. Given the decision to
tax corporate gain and the decision to await recognition events, rather
than to call for and tax periodic appraisals of changes in net worth, it is
hard to argue passionately for or against a particular trigger, or recog-
nition event. Similarly, it is difficult to have strong feelings about the
wisdom of an 80% divide. On the one hand, a rationale behind section
332 is that as long as assets remain in corporate solution deferral does
not generate rate-shopping.'53 On the other hand, allowing all intercor-
porate asset transfers to be nonrecognition events would give taxpayers
too much freedom to determine when they wanted to recognize gain.'
5 '
While it is clear that someone must choose between these themes and
decide whether or not taxpayers should be permitted to back into or out
of section 332, it is doubtful that anyone has values or experiences from
which to derive the optimal level of permissiveness. 5
Would it be appropriate, then, for a judge who must resolve a
recharacterization dispute about backing-in or other corporate tax is-
sues that defy normative argumentation to turn to retrospectively de-
scriptive theories for guidance? In the field of corporate tax law, this
question should be answered affirmatively. In particular, cases concern-
ing backing-in, distributions of boot,' 56 and other matters that arise be-
cause of the arbitrary foundations of the tax system should be decided
in ways that conform to the complete, consistent, brief, and direct qual-
ities of other corporate tax decisions, unless these positive tools are
152 Over many years, with either retained earnings or inflation in the picture,
there is likely to be more untaxed appreciation and, therefore, a greater disinclination
to sell the asset and trigger a tax.
153 Individual shareholders could not also be given the §§ 337-332 option because
it would be too simple to move assets in (with a tax-free incorporation under § 351,
which also requires an 80% transferor) and out of corporate solution depending on the
tax rates applicable to individuals and to shareholders. See I.R.C. §§ 332, 337 (1982 &
West Supp. 1987); I.R.C. § 351 (1982).
I" If assets could be moved between corporations with even the smallest owner-
ship ties, taxpayers in no need of funds for consumption purposes would essentially be
able to trigger taxation only when they desired. Again, taxpayers would look for low-
tax years.
15 This elusiveness is just as easily seen in the context of the other subjects ad-
dressed in this Article. The excess salary question discussed in Section A of Part II, for
instance, can be seen as a version of the arbitrary question of the scope of the two-tier
tax bite. Similarly, bootstrap acquisitions, explored in Section B of Part II, combine the
question of when to recognize gain, in the form of a second tax, with the question of
how to divide a tax between two parties when each can be said to be better off. No
general solution to this last question is possible, much as there is no general solution to
the question of how two parties will bargain to divide a gain or to reach a price be-
tween two constraints.
'"" See supra notes 85-122 and accompanying text.
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thought somehow to be normatively offensive or until competing, more
successful retrospectively descriptive tools are developed, in which case
these new tools ought to guide decisions.
There are two distinct reasons for the affirmative conclusion just
given and, therefore, for the view that the positive tools developed ear-
lier in this Article should play a role in the crafting of future decisions.
The first reason is the rather dull and conservative notion that there is
a need for judicial restraint. Judges should seek out and follow prece-
dential patterns because, in this context, it is an effective way of mak-
ing the law certain, stable, and predictable, a state that virtually all
citizens affected by the corporate tax would favor. It is useful to fulfill
expectations about the outcomes of decisions in order to aid parties in
the planning of their affairs, and retrospectively descriptive patterns
provide such an expectation in an almost unique way. More impor-
tantly, the constraints provided by retrospectively descriptive theories
can curtail corruption and the errors of arrogance.' This assertion
that the "errors of arrogance" will be diminished by additional prece-
dents in the form of descriptive theories means nothing more than that
many judges may in the aggregate be wiser, and even more likely to
stumble on some normatively appealing rule, than only one judge. Ulti-
mately, there is also the chance that judges who wish not to be bound
by patterns not articulated by their predecessors will state their own
reasons for given decisions and in this way offer other judges alterna-
tive means with which to decide cases.
The second reason to favor using retrospectively descriptive tools
in deciding new cases is related to the underlying inseparability of posi-
tive and normative concerns. 5" Positive and normative claims are in-
separable in the familiar sense that neither can be torn free from the
observer's experiences. If complete, consistent, brief, and direct
recharacterizations have had relatively great success in past decisions
despite the fact that these rules are never articulated and that there is
no evolutionary explanation for their emergence, it must be for the
same reason that many readers will find these four characteristics to be
plausible positive tools;'59 shared experiences and a cultural framework
157 Corruption is constrained because, when nothing seems to bind a deci-
sionmaker, it is easier for her to be swayed by what is irrelevant or self-serving.
158 In discussing the separability of positive and normative theories earlier, see
supra note 144 and accompanying text, this Article focused on the question of whether
a given positive theory compelled a normative view or vice versa, in some direct way, or
whether the two are separable other than in the sense that nothing in human judgment
can be entirely separated from cultural and other influences on that judgment.
59 Positive theories are often most convincing when they identify some structural
or evolutionary mechanism that causes decisions to be made in the suggested manner.
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produce a common aesthetic sense, or taste, as to order and elegance. It
is not surprising that scientists find simple geometric forms, "natural"
logarithmic relationships, and short formulas to be elegant and attrac-
tive explanations of observed phenomena, while many students of cor-
porate tax law, in similar fashion, find brief and direct recharacteriza-
tions appealing. The tools with which one describes the past and
present are themselves the product of a shared sense of how to order
the mysteries confronting every observer. While no one can claim that a
community's tastes somehow rise to the level of objective truth or good,
it is sensible to suggest that lawmakers ought to provide constituents
with results that will be perceived as well-ordered.
CONCLUSION
In all of law there is a delicate and mysterious interaction between
positive and normative approaches. Positive theories of law are nor-
mally most convincing when accompanied both by normative arguments
that appeal to the inclinations of the audience to which these arguments
are presented and by evolutionary or causal arguments explaining how
the law came to take its shape. Such positive theories, however, are
relatively rare. When a positive theory lacks these two escorts, its role
in helping to decide cases is limited. This Article has attempted to de-
velop four retrospectively descriptive, positive tools that are of interest
standing alone but that also raise provocative questions about the inter-
action between positive and normative theories in an area of law in
which such questions are, to say the least, not customarily discussed.
To the extent that corporate tax law and, perhaps, some other areas of
law are peculiarly immune to external, normative arguments, there is
every reason to believe that descriptive arguments gain added impor-
tance as the means by which new cases ought to be decided.
Positive theories might thus be regarded as "explained" or "unexplained." It is hard to
see what evolutionary mechanism caused complete, consistent, brief, and direct
recharacterizations. Economies governed by decisions that were not always direct or
brief could certainly survive in historical terms.
It should be emphasized that these four "hidden rules" are not necessarily the
most plausible or elegant. Recharacterizations might have conformed to the equal treat-
ment rule (they did not, although the rule seemed quite elegant), or might have demon-
strated some sense of "symmetry," or might have been retrospectively described in a
manner that blended with common aesthetic preferences. The point is both that detec-
tive work about past decisions may reveal the subset of such inoffensive and even at-
tractive tools that appealed to previous decisionmakers and that it is these tools that
ought to be used. The requirement of retrospective description will serve to constrain
each generation of decisionmakers.
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